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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 — 
UNION PARK ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
Limited Partnership, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
00O00 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appellate Court No. 
930071-CA 
Priority Number 15 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
1. Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals 
to hear this appeal by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (k) (1953 as 
amended). 
2. This appeal is from multiple Orders of the Third Judicial 
District Court as follows: 
(a) Granting Plaintiff's first Motion for Summary 
Judgment, on Plaintiff's Complaint, on the issue of 
Defendant's liability; 
(b) Denying Defendant's Motion for Leave to Amend; 
(c) Granting Plaintiff's second Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the issues of damages, late fees, interest and 
Plaintiff's entitlement to attorney's fees; and 
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(d) Denying Defendants Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the issue of the propriety of the contract 
interest rate. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Memorandum and supporting Affidavits filed by 
Defendant/Appellant in opposition to Plaintiff's first Motion for 
Summary Judgment raise a genuine issue as to a material fact to 
defeat Plaintiff's right to Judgment for liability against 
Defendant for the balance due and owing on a Promissory Note? 
Plaintiff's Summary Judgment was granted by the lower Court as a 
matter of law and is therefore subject to review for correctness by 
this Court. Barber vs. Farmers Ins. Exch., 751 P.2d 248 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1988). 
2. Did the District Court commit an abuse of its broad 
discretion by denying the Defendant's Motion for Leave to Amend, 
which Motion was totally unsupported by either Affidavits, 
evidentiary materials or a Memorandum, and which Motion the Court 
determined to be moot as a result of the Court's granting of 
Plaintiff's first Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of 
liability? The District Court has broad discretion in matters 
regarding amendments to pleadings, which decisions are subject to 
review only for abuse of discretion. Goeltz vs. Continental Bank 
& Trust Co., 299 P.2d 832 (Utah 1956). 
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3. Did the District Court err in granting Plaintiff fs Motion 
for Summary Judgment on the issue of damages and denying 
Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment by calculating 
interest under the Promissory Note on a Mper annum" interest rate 
as required by Utah statute? Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the issue of damages was granted as a matter of law and 
is therefore subject to review for correctness by this Court. 
Barber vs. Farms Ins. Exch.. 751 P.2d 248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The 
motion shall be served at least 10 days before 
the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse 
party prior to the day of hearing may serve 
opposing affidavits. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on 
the issue of liability alone although there is 
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration; 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda. 
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All 
motions, except uncontested or ex-parte 
matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum 
of points and authorities appropriate 
affidavits, and copies of or citations by page 
number to relevant portions of depositions, 
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exhibits or other documents relied upon in 
support of the motion. Memoranda supporting 
or opposing a motion shall not exceed ten 
pages in length exclusive of the "statement of 
material facts11 as provided in paragraph (2), 
except as waived by order of the court on ex-
parte application. If an ex parte application 
is made to file an over-length memorandum, the 
application shall state the length of the 
principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is 
in excess of ten pages, the application shall 
include a summary of the memorandum, not to 
exceed five pages. 
Motions for summary judgment. 
(a) Memorandum in support of motion. The 
points and authorities in support of a motion 
for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of 
material facts as to which movant contends no 
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be 
stated in separate numbered sentences and 
shall specifically refer to those portions of 
the record upon which the movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. 
The points and authorities in opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of 
material facts as to which the party contends 
a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact 
shall be stated in separate numbered sentences 
and shall specifically refer to those portions 
of the record upon which the opposing party 
relies, and if applicable, shall state the 
numbered sentence or sentences of the movantfs 
facts that are disputed. All material facts 
set forth in the movant1s statement and 
properly supported by an accurate reference to 
the record shall be deemed admitted for the 
purpose of summary judgment unless 
specifically controverted by the opposing 
partyfs statement. 
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Utah Code Ann, § 15-1-3 (1953 as amended): 
Whenever in any statute or deed, or written or 
verbal contract, or in any public or private 
instrument whatever, any certain rate of 
interest is mentioned and no period of time is 
stated, interest shall be calculated at the 
rate mentioned by the year. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 16, 1990 the Appellee/Plaintiff, Union Park 
Associates (hereinafter "Union Park"), commenced the present action 
against Appellant/Defendant, Gump & Ayers Real Estate, Inc. 
(hereinafter "Gump & Ayers") (R. 2) . Pursuant to its Complaint, 
Union Park sought recovery for the balance due and owing on a 
Promissory Note executed by Gump & Ayers (R. 2 and 3) . On December 
13, 1990, Gump & Ayers filed an Answer admitting execution and non-
payment but denying liability (R. 14). Union Park answered Gump & 
Ayers' discovery requests on January 14, 1991 (R. 19), and filed 
its first Motion for Summary Judgment on February 22, 1991 (R. 50). 
That Motion was supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authority 
as well as an Affidavit filed contemporaneously therewith (R. 21 
and 53). Union Park further filed an Affidavit in support of its 
request for attorneyfs fees (R. 21). Gump & Ayers received one 
extension of time within which to respond to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, by stipulation of the parties (R. 187). Thereafter, Gump 
& Ayers filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment on March 21, 1991 (R. 213). Gump & Ayers1 response was 
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supported by two Affidavits (R. 189 and 207). Simultaneously with 
filing its Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Gump & 
Ayers filed a Motion for Leave to Amend its Answer to raise the 
defense of fraud in the inducement, as well as a counter-claim 
similarly predicated upon fraud (R. 235). Gump & Ayers1 Motion for 
Leave to Amend was unsupported by either Affidavits or a 
Memorandum. Union Park filed a Memorandum in Response to the 
Motion for Leave to Amend (R. 263) and a Reply Memorandum in 
support of its Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 317). Union Park's 
Reply Memorandum was supported by supplemental affidavits (R. 289 
and 335). 
All pending Motions, including Union Parkfs Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Gump & Ayers1 Motion for Leave to Amend were scheduled 
for hearing before the Court on November 4, 1991 (R. 431). Hearing 
on the aforementioned Motions was continued and ultimately held by 
the Court on January 10, 1992 (R. 436) . At the hearing, Union 
Park's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted on the issue of 
liability. Issues of damages and attorney's fees were reserved for 
further proceedings (R. 471). Gump & Ayers' Motion for Leave to 
Amend was denied (R. 471). Due to objections to Union Park's 
proposed Order, the Order of the Court was not entered until August 
25, 1992 (R. 449, 456, 470). 
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Union Park filed a second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
on the remaining issues of damages and attorney's fees on August 
28, 1992 (R. 474). The Second Motion for Summary Judgment was 
supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities (R. 474) and an 
Affidavit of Amount Due and Owing (R. 502). Gump & Ayers obtained, 
by Motion, a second extension of time (R. 536), and finally filed 
a Memorandum and Affidavit in Response to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment on September 30, 1992 (R. 549 and 553). Gump & Ayers also 
filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of the 
interpretation to be given to the interest rate set forth in the 
Note (R. 566). On October 8, 1992, Union Park filed a Reply 
Memorandum in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and in 
response to the Gump & Ayers1 Cross-Motion (R. 574). 
The Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment were heard by the Court 
on November 30, 1992 (R. 743). Union Park's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the issues of damages and attorneyfs fees was granted 
while the Gump & Ayers1 Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
appropriate interest rate was denied (R. 606). The present appeal 
ensued (R. 595). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
FACTS RELEVANT TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Appellant has not separately numbered its Statement of Facts, 
which cannot therefore be specifically identified for purposes of 
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objection; and numerous "factual" statements are essentially legal 
conclusions, as Appellant presumes ultimate findings, such as 
fraud. Consequently, Appellee objects to Appellant1s Statements of 
Fact in total, and hereby states the relevant facts to the issues 
on appeal. 
1« Union Park is the owner of a commercial office building 
located at 5925 Union Park Center, Midvale, Utah, which premises 
shall hereinafter be referred to as the "Subject Premises11 (R. 31) . 
2. On June 1, 1983, Union Park as landlord and Gump & Ayers 
as tenant entered into and executed a Lease Agreement (Lease Number 
290), pertaining to office space on the second floor of the Subject 
Premises (R. 31 and 66). 
3. Pursuant to Lease Number 290, Gump & Ayers leased 4,497 
square feet of office space for a period of ten years beginning 
March 1, 1984 (R. 31 and 216). 
4. On June 28, 1985, Union Park as landlord and Gump & Ayers 
as tenant entered into and executed a second Lease Agreement (Lease 
Number 260) pursuant to which Gump & Ayers acquired additional 
adjoining office space in the subject premises (R. 31 and 32). 
5. Pursuant to the terms of Lease Number 260, Gump & Ayers 
leased the additional space for eight years and eight months 
beginning August 26, 1985 (R. 84 and 102). 
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6. Defendant Gump & Ayers continued to pay rentals pursuant 
to the aforementioned Agreements through the month of April, 1988 
and ceased to make lease payments thereafter and vacated the 
premises in May, 1988 (R. 32). 
7. At the time Gump & Ayers ceased to make its monthly 
rental payments, the monthly rental obligation was the sum of 
$7,733.37 (R. 292). 
8. On December 7, 1988, Union Park and Gump & Ayers entered 
into a Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release of Claims to resolve 
the unliquidated continuing liability of Gump & Ayers to Union Park 
under the two (2) outstanding leases for commercial space. The 
Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release operated as a release of 
Gump & Ayers1 liability to Union Park on the outstanding leases in 
exchange for payment of consideration consisting of an initial 
payment of $10,000.00, a second payment of $10,000.00 due December 
15, 1988 and execution of a Promissory Note providing for payment 
of the principal sum of $55,000.00. A copy of the Settlement 
Agreement and Mutual Release of Claims is attached hereto as 
Addendum Exhibit f,A". A copy of the Promissory Note is attached 
hereto as Addendum Exhibit lfBlf. These documents were before the 
Court in numerous pleadings (R. 3, 15, 104 and 108). 
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9. Gump & Ayers made payments under the Note through July 
16, 1990 (R. 291) . Gump & Ayers has refused to make further 
payment under the Note (R. 3 and 15). 
10. There is a principal balance due and owing on the Note in 
the sum of $35,352.46 as of July 16, 1990 (R. 291). 
11. At the time the Settlement Agreement was prepared in 
November, there was past-due and owing pursuant to the Lease 
Agreements the sum of $54,133.59 for rentals for the months of May 
through November, 1988 (R. 292, 195 and 217). On the date of 
execution, Decemberfs rent also had accrued in the sum of $7,733.37 
for total rent due in the sum of $61,866.96. 
12. Thus, the sum of $13,133.04 was to be paid to resolve 
Gump & Ayers1 potential liability for future unaccrued rentals 
(settlement amount of $75,000.00 minus accrued rentals of 
$61,866.96 equals $13,133.04). 
13. As of the date of the execution of the Settlement 
Agreement, Gump & Ayers had potential liability to Union Park for 
unaccrued rentals in the sum of $487,202.31 calculated as follows: 
a. December 1988 through February 1994 (date of 
termination of earliest lease, Number 290 (R. 216) equals 
^sixty-three (63) months). 
b. Monthly lease obligations of $7,733.37 (R. 292). 
C. $7,733.37 x 63 = $487,202.31. 
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d. This figure does not take into account potential 
increases for shared tenant expenses due under the lease and 
escalation clauses (R. 67). 
14. While negotiating with Gump & Ayers to settle its 
potential liability, Union Park was also negotiating with third 
parties in order to mitigate damages to Union Park as a result of 
the breach (R. 35 and 59). 
15. On November 23, 1988, Union Park entered into a Lease 
with Matrix Funding Corporation covering a portion of the space 
formerly occupied by Gump & Ayers. Matrix did not take possession, 
nor begin paying rents until January, 1989 (R. 35, 60 and 136). 
16. However, in the process, Matrix Funding Corporation 
vacated other space in the Subject Premises, which space remained 
vacant for one year (R. 35 and 60). 
17. In order to secure rental of the portion of the space 
formerly occupied by Gump & Ayers by Matrix Funding, Union Park re-
negotiated its lease with Matrix Funding and received a lower rent 
per square foot (R. 35 and 60) . 
18. In connection with the partial reletting of the Gump & 
Ayers space to Matrix Funding, Union Park incurred costs in the sum 
of $18,559.00 in leasehold improvements (R. 36 and 60). 
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19. By a Lease Agreement dated April 30, 1988, Union Park was 
able to lease the balance of the former Gump & Ayers space to 
Miles, Inc. (R. 36 and 61). 
20. Presuming that the two substitute tenants identified 
herein remain in possession of the subject premises and pay all 
rentals on time, Gump & Ayers1 minimum potential liability for 
future rents, as of the date it entered into the Settlement 
Agreement, was in the sum of $71,531.82 (rental shortfalls 
$52,972.82 plus tenant improvements $18,559.00 equals $71,531.82).1 
1RENT EXPECTATIONS (R. 61 and 62) 
1968 
Gump & Ayers $7,159.92 * $573.45 = $ 7,733.37 per month 
Nos. 260 and 290 
Matrix $6,666.45 • 2,366.27 = $ 9,032.72 per month 
Nos. 250 and 260 
LOSS MITIGATION 
1989 
Matrix 
No. 250 
Miles, Inc. 
No. 290 
Difference 
5 months 
$12,967.04 
1.362.71 
$14,329.75 
$ 2,436.34 
LOSS EXPECTATION THROUGH MAY 31. 1994 
($2,436.34 x 
( 2,112.13 x 
J 518.21 x 
5 months) = 
6 months) = 
54 months) = 
Rental Differential Subtotal: 
IMPROVEMENTS = 
TOTAL: 
$16,766.09 
6 months 
$13,291.25 
1.362.71 
$14,653.96 
$ 2,112.13 
$12,316.70 
12,672.78 
27.983.34 
$52,972.82 
$18,559.00 
$71,531.82 
1 month 
$14,653.96 
1.593.92 
$16,247.88 
$ 518.21 
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21. Gump & Ayers opened settlement negotiations prior to 
October 4, 1988 (R. 314). 
22. No portion of the Subject Premises was leased to a 
substitute tenant prior to November 23, 1988, on which date a 
portion of the Subject Premises was relet to Matrix Funding. Even 
that portion of the Subject Premises remained vacant until January 
1, 1989 (R. 135). 
FACTS RELEVANT TO GUMP t AYERS* MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE 
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
23. Simultaneously with filing its Answer, Gump & Ayers 
propounded discovery requests to Union Park (R. 14 and 18). 
24. Union Park responded to the outstanding discovery on 
January 10, 1991 (R. 19) , and waited over one month, until February 
22, 1991, prior to filing its Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 19 
and 28)• 
25. Gump & Ayers responded to the Motion for Summary Judgment 
on March 21, 1991 (R. 213) and on March 22, 1991 filed a Motion for 
Leave to file an Amended Answer as well as a Counterclaim, both of 
which sought relief based upon allegations of fraud (R. 235). 
26. Gump & Ayers1 Motion for Leave to Amend was completely 
unsupported. It is composed of two sentences, neither of which 
argues any legal basis demonstrating that Gump & Ayers was entitled 
to the relief requested (R. 235). 
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27. Argument on Union Park's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
on Gump & Ayers1 Motion for Leave to Amend was heard by the Court 
on January 10, 1992 (Appendix Exhibit "C" at Page 1). 
28. The Court stated, at the opening of argument, that it was 
not necessary to hold specific and separate arguments on the two 
Motions, as the subject matter of the two was intertwined (Addendum 
Exhibit MC" at Pages 2 and 3). 
29. Mr. McDonald, counsel for Gump & Ayers, agreed that the 
various Motions pending before the Court were all related and that 
argument relevant to the Motion for Summary Judgment ,fis going to 
really resolve everything" (Addendum Exhibit MC" Page 4). 
30. The Court gave full consideration to Gump & Ayers' 
arguments of fraud (R. 437), and only after hearing all of Gump & 
Ayers' arguments relevant to the issue of fraud, and determining 
that any misrepresentation, if made, was not shown to be material 
(R. 437), granted Union Park's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
denied Gump & Ayers' Motion for Leave to Amend to raise fraud both 
as an affirmative defense and as a counterclaim as said Motion was 
then moot (R. 442) . 
31. In response to Mr. McDonald's comment to the Court that 
he felt denial of his Motion for Leave to Amend had kept the issue 
of fraud from coming before the Court (R. 443), the Court 
specifically responded that the Motion was before the Court, it was 
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a pending Motion, that the Defendant had argued the issue of fraud 
and that the Court had duly considered Defendant's fraud claims (R. 
443) . 
32. On August 25, 1992, the Court entered an Order granting 
Union Park's Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of liability, 
reserving for further proceedings issues of damages. By that same 
Order, Gump & Ayers1 Motion for Leave to Amend was denied (R. 470, 
471) . 
FACTS RELEVANT TO UNION PARK'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON DAMAGES AND GUMP AND AYERS' CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT PERTAINING TO PROPRIETY OF INTEREST RATE 
33. Union Park filed its second Motion for Summary Judgment 
on the issue of damages on August 28, 1992 (R. 474). 
34. The Motion for Summary Judgment was supported by a 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities (R. 477) and an Affidavit of 
Amount Due and Owing (R. 502). 
35. Union Park's second Motion for Summary Judgment was 
granted by Order dated December 16, 1992. Union Park obtained 
Judgment for the principal balance owing on the Note, as well as 
attorneyfs fees, costs of Court and interest at the rate of 10% per 
annum (R. 606-608) . Gump & Ayers now appeals only the propriety of 
the Court's use of a 10% "per annum11 interest rate. (See. 
Appellant's Brief). 
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36. The portion of the Promissory Note which describes the 
interest rate reads as follows: "This Note shall bear interest at 
the rate of ten percent (10%) from and after May 1, 1988" (R. 507) . 
37. Gump & Ayers1 Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment filed on 
October 1, 1992 pertains solely to the same issue of determining 
the time period pursuant to which the 10% interest rate is to be 
calculated (R. 568). 
38. The Court Order dated December 16, 1992 also denied Gump 
& Ayers1 Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 606, 607 and 608). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
The present action arose out of Gump & Ayers1 breach of its 
Lease Agreements with Union Park. It has never been disputed that 
Gump & Ayers leased premises from Union Park pursuant to two Lease 
Agreements dated June 1, 1983 and June 28, 1985 (R. 54). It is 
undisputed that the leases were to run through early 1994 (R. 55) . 
Gump & Ayers admits that it breached the Lease Agreements by 
abandoning the premises in May, 1988 at a time when it had 
approximately five (5) years remaining liability under the Leases 
(R. 190). Gump & Ayers admits that it remained liable for ongoing 
Lease; payments, despite the fact that it had vacated the premises 
(R. 190). 
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After substantial negotiations, the parties executed a 
Settlement Agreement in December, 1988, which Agreement was to 
resolve the accrued liabilities of Gump & Ayers for the eight (8) 
months which had elapsed since its abandonment of the premises, as 
well as an additional sum in settlement of liability for future 
lease payments that might accrue with respect to the abandoned 
premises (R. 192). The Settlement Agreement included a Promissory 
Note in the sum of $55,000.00, which Note is the subject matter of 
Union Park's present action. 
Union Park brought the present action to enforce that 
Promissory Note. Gump & Ayers1 sole defense to liability is based 
on alleged misrepresentations regarding re-leasing of the premises, 
which induced them to enter into the Settlement Agreement and 
Promissory Note. Gump & Ayers alleges it would not have agreed to 
pay any sums in excess of rentals already accrued, had it not been 
for the allegedly fraudulent representations. Thus, the issue 
before the District Court, which is the same issue to be reviewed 
by this Court, was whether Gump & Ayers produced sufficient 
evidence of material fraudulent representations to preclude the 
enforcement of the Settlement Agreement and Promissory Note. The 
District Court properly concluded that the evidence produced by 
Gump & Ayers was insufficient as a matter of law. Union Park's 
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Motion for Summary Judgment was granted on the issue of liability 
and the Defendant's Motion for leave to Amend was denied. 
Union Park's second Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on 
the issue of damages. Union Park prevailed on all points, 
including the principal balance due and owing on the Note, right to 
attorney's fees and costs, as well as interest. Gump & Ayers filed 
a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of the appropriate 
interest rate to be employed. The Note provides that interest be 
calculated at the rate of 10% but does not state the time period 
over which interest is to be calculated. The Court properly 
employed a per annum interest rate in reliance on Utah statutes. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER WHEN THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE 
AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT 
The standard for entry of Summary Judgment as set forth under 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reads as follows: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
(Emphasis added). 
Utah case law makes it clear that Rule 56 requires two (2) 
separate inquiries. There must be a genuine issue of fact to be 
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resolved by the trier of fact. Further, the disputed fact must be 
material to the outcome of the action. "The foregoing rule does 
not preclude summary judgment simply whenever some fact remains in 
dispute, but only when a material fact is genuinely controverted". 
(Emphasis added). Healar Ranch, Inc. vs. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390, 
1391 (Utah 1980). 
It is undisputed that Gump & Ayers breached its Lease 
obligations to Union Park. It is also undisputed that past-due 
rentals in the amount of $61,855.96 were due at the time that Gump 
& Ayers agreed to settle its past and future obligations for 
$75,000.00, payable $20,000.00 initially with the balance over time 
pursuant to the subject Note. It is undisputed that Gump & Ayers 
signed the Settlement Agreement and Note and made payments for a 
while. Consequently, Gump & Ayers1 only defense to being obligated 
under the Note is its allegation of fraudulent inducement. Gump & 
Ayers has only cited one representation that it alleges was false 
which supports its claim. 
Gump & Ayers alleges, through the Affidavit of Jerry Floor, 
that during late November and early December, 1988 (the Settlement 
Agreement was executed December 7, 1988), an officer of Union Park 
represented to him that the leased premises remained vacant at that 
time (R. 192). Union Park submitted significant evidence 
contradicting the Defendants allegation that this allegedly false 
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representation was made. (See, Affidavit of Thomas Lloyd# R. 289-
314). 
Union Park disputed this allegation and produced to the Court 
a copy of the Lease Agreement with the first substitute tenant 
(Matrix Funding), which tenant took over a portion of the space 
vacated by Gump & Ayers. That Lease Agreement establishes that 
this entity did not take possession of the premises and begin 
paying rent until January, 1989 (R. 135). Therefore, the premises 
were vacant at the time Gump & Ayers alleges the representations 
were made. Union Park also produced for the Court copies of the 
time records of the attorney who represented Gump & Ayers in the 
negotiations. Those time records establish that negotiations 
actually occurred prior to execution of the Matrix Lease (R. 335) . 
It is Union Park's position that any representations which were 
made regarding the status of the premises during the negotiation 
phase were made at a time when the premises were not only vacant, 
but not subject to a new lease. Consequently, even the existence 
of a disputed fact is questionable. 
It is apparent that the District Court disbelieved Gump & 
Ayers and felt that no misrepresentation had been made. "I am not 
convinced that there were misrepresentations, but there is some 
evidence to the contrary11 (R. 437) . However, the District Court 
indulged Gump & Ayers on this point stating: wAnd so on that 
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point, Plaintiff would not be entitled to Summary Judgment alone" 
(R. 437). Therefore, the District Court properly resolved the 
disputed fact of the misrepresentation in favor of Gump & Ayers. 
However, the District Court went on to grant Summary Judgment 
on the issue of liability, stating that even if such a 
representation had been made, it was not material to the Settlement 
Agreement and Promissory Note. The Court stated: 
...[I]t seems to me that that, under all of 
the facts, including the contractual 
obligations which the defendants submit they 
did owe at that time, both having already 
accrued and what they were exposed to, and in 
light of the damages amounts that the 
plaintiffs did suffer as a result of the 
termination of the lease, and cost associated 
with re-letting, and all of that, when you 
look at all of the numbers that are involved, 
I just don't see this as material. ...For 
that reason then, I am not inclined to accord 
that view and would rather on the issue of 
liability grant summary judgment in favor of 
the plaintiff. 
(R. 438) . Thus, the issue is whether, giving Gump & Ayers the 
benefit of the presumption that the allegedly false statements were 
made, whether they had any material bearing on the execution of the 
Settlement Agreement and Promissory Note. It is clear that they 
did not. 
A. The District Court properly applied the "clear and 
convincing evidence" standard. 
Gump & Ayers raised the affirmative defense of fraud in the 
inducement to the enforcement of the Promissory Note. Fraud is a 
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wrong of such a nature that its existence must be shown by clear 
and convincing evidence. Tavlor vs. Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d 293 
(Utah 1980). When opposing a motion for summary judgment on an 
integrated contract, and with all disputes resolved in its favor, 
the party alleging fraud must demonstrate the elements of fraud in 
a clear and convincing manner. Laird vs. Laird, 597 P.2d 463, 466 
(Wyo. 1979), and Applied Genetics vs. First Affiliated Securities, 
912 F.2d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir. 1990). Further, the Promissory Note 
which Union Park attempts to enforce is part of a Settlement 
Agreement. Settlement agreements will only be set aside for the 
strongest of reasons, which also must be shown by clear and 
convincing evidence. Lomas & Nettleton Co. vs. Tiger Enterprises, 
585 P.2d 949 (Idaho 1978). After reviewing the evidence and giving 
full consideration to Gump & Ayers1 evidence of fraud (R. 437) and 
resolving the factual disputes in favor of Gump & Ayers, as the 
non-moving party, the District Court properly applied these 
standards and granted Summary Judgment in favor of Union Park on 
the issue of liability. Even after resolving all disputes in Gump 
& Ayers1 favor the Court felt that: "...Defendant has not shown by 
clear and convincing evidence that the misrepresentations were 
material...,f (R. 437). This Court should also apply the "clear and 
convincing standard" in reviewing the Order granting Union Parkfs 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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The leading case on this point is Anderson vs. Liberty Lobby. 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed. 2d 202 (1986). In the 
Anderson case, the United States Supreme Court was reviewing a 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant. The case 
dealt with a libel case in which the plaintiff carried the burden 
of proving that the allegedly libelous material was published with 
malice. The United States Supreme Court in Anderson determined 
that a court, when reviewing a motion for summary judgment, should 
consider the substantive evidentiary burden that the non-moving 
party has to carry in the event of a trial on the merits. Id. at 
252. The Supreme Court noted that they should apply the clear and 
convincing standard which applies to libel cases. Id. at 244. The 
Supreme Court in Anderson acknowledged that there was a time when 
the test at the summary judgment stage was the "scintilla of 
evidence" standard. 
Formerly, it was held that if there was what 
is called a scintilla of evidence in support 
of a case, the judge was bound to leave it to 
the jury, but recent decisions of high 
authority have established a more reasonable 
rule, that in every case, before the evidence 
is left to the jury, there is a preliminary 
question for the judge, not whether there is 
literally no evidence, but whether there is 
any upon which a jury could properly proceed 
to find a verdict for the party producing it, 
upon whom the onus of proof is imposed. 
(Boldface in the original, additional emphasis 
added)• 
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Id. at 251. The Supreme Court expressly rejected the "scintilla" 
rule and adopted the position that, even at the summary judgment 
stage, the substantive evidentiary burden should be considered. 
Thus, in ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment, the judge must view the evidence 
presented through the prism of the substantive 
evidentiary burden. This conclusion is 
mandated by the nature of this determination. 
The question here is whether a jury could 
reasonably find either that the plaintiff 
proved his case by the quality and quantity of 
evidence required by the governing law or that 
he did not. (Emphasis added)• 
Id. at 254. 
Further, the Supreme Court in Anderson, acknowledged that a 
judge is still not to weigh evidence, but to give the non-moving 
party the benefit of every dispute and presumption. 
[I]t is clear enough from our recent cases 
that at the summary judgment case the judge's 
function is not himself to weigh the evidence 
and determine the truth of the matter, but to 
determine whether there is a genuine issue for 
trial. 
Id. at 249. However, if having given the non-moving party the 
benefit of every presumption and inference, no reasonable finder of 
fact could find in favor of the non-moving party, summary judgment 
is proper. 
The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry 
of determining whether there is the need for a 
trial - whether, in other words, there are any 
genuine factual issues that properly can be 
resolved only by a finder of fact, because 
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they may reasonably be resolved in favor of 
either party. (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 250. 
Finally, while the Anderson case was a libel case, the United 
States Supreme Court specifically provided that the substantive 
burden of evidence is relevant to any civil case. It specifically 
stated: 
This view is equally applicable to a civil 
case to which the "clear and convincing" 
standard applies. ...Thus, in ruling on a 
motion for summary judgment, the judge must 
view the evidence presented through the 
substantive evidentiary burden. (Emphasis 
added). 
Id. at 254. 
The "substantive burden" test as set forth in Anderson has 
been adopted by many jurisdictions and in many factual scenarios. 
This test was adopted by the Nevada Supreme Court in the case of 
Bulbman, Inc. vs. Nevada Bell, 825 P.2d 588 (Nev. 1992), in which 
a fraud claim was dismissed at the summary judgment stage. The 
Nevada Supreme Court noted that the pleadings and proof should be 
construed in a light most favorable to the moving party. Id. at 
591. After acknowledging that the Summary Judgment standard has 
not changed in that regard, the Court went on, in reliance on the 
Anderson case, to rule that summary judgment is still proper if 
viewing the fact in a light favoring the non-moving party the 
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evidence is such that no reasonable finder of fact could return a 
verdict for the non-moving party. Id. 
The same result was reached by the Washington Appellate Court 
in Adams vs. Allen, 783 P.2d 635 (Wash. App. 1989). The Adams case 
was again a summary judgment case involving a claim of fraud. In 
Adams the court noted that the party pleading fraud must produce 
evidence on all of the elements of fraud to fulfill its burden of 
proof. The Court then dismissed the claim of fraud in reliance on 
the Anderson substantive burden test. Id. at 640. 
The Arizona Supreme Court has also adopted the "substantive 
burden test" in a series of cases which has applied the test to all 
civil cases. This series of cases begins with Dombey vs. Phoenix 
Newspapers. Inc., 724 P.2d 562 (Ariz. 1986). In Dombey, the 
Arizona Supreme Court applied the "substantive burden" test in the 
context of a libel case. 
In sum we conclude that the determination of 
whether a given factual dispute requires 
submission to a jury must be guided by the 
substantive evidentiary standards that apply 
to the case. This is true at both the 
directed verdict and summary judgment stages. 
Consequently, where the New York Times "clear 
and convincing" evidence requirement applies, 
the trial judgefs summary judgment inquiry as 
to whether a genuine issue exists will be 
whether the evidence presented is such that a 
jury applying that evidentiary standard could 
reasonably find for either the plaintiff or 
the defendant. 
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Id. at 572. The Arizona Supreme Court subsequently applied the 
rule to ordinary tort cases. In the case of Orme School vs. 
Reeves, 802 P.2d 1000 (Ariz. 1990), the court was faced with a 
motion for summary judgment pertaining to an indemnity claim. In 
Orme, a student contracted salmonella from meals served to him at 
school. The disease was contracted during a time period during 
which the student consumed 122 different meals at the school. 
However, only one was prepared by the school. The other 121 meals 
were prepared by an outside food service. The school filed a 
motion for summary judgment and prevailed. The court in Orme noted 
that in this tort case the standard of evidence was merely one of 
"preponderance". Moreover, and in reliance of the Anderson case, 
the court determined that the chance that the school prepared the 
"culpable" meal, which was a less than 1 in 100 chance, would not 
provide a fact finder with a reasonable basis upon which to find 
the school liable. 
On such evidence, no reasonable juror could 
conclude by even a preponderance of the 
evidence that Orme, rather than CWS, was 
actively responsible for the injury through 
meals. 
Id. at 1010. 
This series of cases was most recently reaffirmed in Thompson 
vs. Better-Bilt Aluminum Prod., 832 P.2d 203 (Ariz. 1982), wherein 
the Arizona Supreme Court again reiterated that the non-moving 
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party is to receive all reasonable inferences, but thereafter the 
court can still grant summary judgment if appropriate. 
...[T]he motion should be granted if no 
reasonable jury could find the requisite evil 
mind by clear and convincing evidence. 
Id. at 211. 
The "substantive burden" test has also been adopted by the 
Wyoming Supreme Court in Albrecht vs. Zwaanshoek Holding, 762 P.2d 
1174 (Wyo. 1988) in a summary judgment case involving a claim of 
fraud. The court noted that it is not the judgefs function to 
weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to 
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial and in that 
process the Anderson test is to be employed. 
The correct approach is articulated in 
Anderson vs. Liberty Lobby [citation omitted]. 
The standard to be applied for that purpose is 
whether a reasonable jury could find the 
evidence sufficient to meet the clear and 
convincing standard... 
Id. at 1182. 
Consequently, in light of the authority of Anderson, and the 
subsequent cases which have adopted the "substantive burden" test 
in similar circumstances, the proper standard to review Gump & 
Ayers1 defense of fraud is whether there was sufficient evidence, 
after all inferences and disputes resolved in its favor, to find 
that it had met its burden of showing by clear and convincing 
evidence that a fraud had occurred. This requires an inquiry into 
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all elements of fraud, including materiality and reasonable 
reliance. As will be shown in Subpart B below, the District Court, 
after resolving all factual disputes in favor of Gump & Ayers, 
properly concluded that Gump & Ayers had not shown by clear and 
convincing evidence that the alleged misrepresentation was 
material. Therefore, the District Court correctly granted Summary 
Judgment in favor of Union Park. Further, the ruling can also be 
supported on the basis that there was no showing by Gump & Ayers of 
reasonable reliance, or Union Park's intention to induce reliance, 
or Gump & Ayers1 consequent damage. This Court should approve this 
standard, and rule that it was properly applied in affirming the 
Order granting Summary Judgment in Union Park's favor. 
B. The District Court properly determined that Gump & Ayers1 
allegations did not raise an issue of material fact. 
In order to review the ruling that Gump & Ayers did not show 
by clear and convincing evidence the "materiality" of the allegedly 
fraudulent statements, it is necessary to review the factual 
context and what the District Court referred to as "all of the 
numbers that are involved". When one examines Gump & Ayers1 
potential liability under the Lease Agreements, both its minimum 
and its maximum potential liability, it cannot be reasonably found 
that the alleged misrepresentation had a material effect on 
inducing execution of the Settlement Agreement. 
29 
Gump & Ayers abandoned the leased premises in May, 1988 (R. 
190). It signed the Settlement Agreement and Promissory Note on 
December 7, 1988 (R. 192). Gump & Ayers admits that the Settlement 
Agreement and Promissory Note were intended to resolve not only its 
accrued liability as of that date, but also its potential future 
liability (R. 194, 195). As of the date of the Settlement 
Agreement, the accrued liability of Gump & Ayers for the eight (8) 
months which had elapsed since it abandoned the premises, was the 
sum of $61,866.96 (R. 292). This is predicated on a calculation of 
Gump & Ayers1 monthly lease obligation of $7,733.37 over the eight 
(8) months which had elapsed. This left the sum of $13,133.04 as 
a payment in settlement of potential future liability2. Thus, the 
sum of $13,133.04 was to be paid to settle Gump & Ayers1 potential 
future liability. In defense, Gump & Ayers stated that it would 
not have agreed to pay any sum in excess of accrued rentals had it 
known that a portion of the premises it had abandoned was subject 
to a lease agreement with a substitute tenant (R. 192). In 
2Gump & Ayers contends that the monthly lease obligation was 
$7,516.26, which would have resulted in a payment of $60,130.08 for 
accrued obligations, while leaving $14,869.92 to be paid in 
settlement of potential future obligations (R. 195). Union Park 
believes its calculation to be more accurate. Union Park submitted 
to the District Court, through the Supplemental Affidavit of Thomas 
Lloyd, documentation of the actual amounts paid by Gump & Ayers 
pursuant to its Lease Agreement, which documentation supports Union 
Park's calculation. Gump & Ayers never, thereafter attempted to 
contradict Union Park's use of the $7,733.37 per month figure. 
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response to this allegation Union Park provided the Court with 
evidence of the total amount for which Gump & Ayers would be liable 
to Union Park, pursuant to the Leases, were the Settlement 
Agreement never entered into. These numbers, which were not 
substantively disputed by Gump & Ayers, conclusively establish, as 
a matter of law, the immateriality of the alleged 
misrepresentations• 
As pointed-out above, Gump & Ayers agreed to pay the sum of 
$13,133.04, in excess of its accrued liabilities, in settlement of 
its potential future liabilities under the Lease. As of the date 
of the execution of the Settlement Agreement and Promissory Note, 
Gump & Ayers1 potential future liability was in the sum of 
$487,775.76. (See, Statement of Facts at Paragraph 15). This 
figure represents the Lease obligations, as of the date of the 
Settlement Agreement, multiplied by the number of months remaining 
on the Lease. This amount does not include increases in tenant 
shared expenses and escalator clauses, which were unliquidated at 
the time of the settlement agreement. This potential future 
liability obviously dwarfs the amount paid by Gump & Ayers to 
settle its future liability. However, even more telling is Gump & 
Ayers1 minimum potential liability under the Lease Agreement. 
As set forth in the Statement of Facts, Union Park had managed 
to partially mitigate its damages by entering into a substitute 
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lease agreement, pursuant to which a portion of the space formerly 
leased to Gump & Ayers would be occupied by a substitute tenant. 
This is the lease which Gump & Ayers claims was not revealed to it, 
and upon which it bases its affirmative defense of fraud. 
Approximately six (6) months after execution of the Settlement 
Agreement and Promissory Note, Union Park was able to further 
mitigate its damages by reletting the remainder of the premises. 
This fact, having not occurred at the time the Settlement Agreement 
was executed, could not have possibly been within the contemplation 
of the parties. However, for purposes of argument, Union Park 
presented to the Court a calculation of damages which it suffered 
and will suffer, even with the entirety of the leased premises 
relet to new tenants. The calculation presented to the District 
Court also presumed that the substitute tenants would remain and 
pay all lease payments in a timely manner. Of course, this is 
giving Gump & Ayers the benefit of every possible inference. In 
the absence of the Settlement Agreement, if any of these tenants 
were to abandon the premises prior to termination of Gump & Ayers 
original Lease Agreements, or fail to meet their Lease obligations, 
Gump & Ayers would have remained liable through early 1995. Giving 
Gump~& Ayers the benefit of all these inferences and presumptions, 
Gump & Ayers would still be liable to Union Park for future rentals 
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in the sum of $71,531.82 if the Settlement Agreement and Promissory 
Note were set aside. (See. Statement of Facts at Paragraph 22). 
In summary, Gump & Ayers agreed to pay the sum of $13,133.04 
to settle future unliquidated lease liabilities, which would range 
between a minimum of $71,531.82 and a maximum of $487,775.76. In 
light of these numbers, Gump & Ayers1 allegation that Union Park 
failed to inform it, at the time of the negotiations, that it had 
entered into a lease agreement which would, in the future, place a 
tenant in a portion of the premises, is completely immaterial. In 
fact, Gump & Ayers1 liability would only increase if the Settlement 
Agreement were set aside. 
A settlement agreement is a contract like any other which must 
be supported by consideration. It is clear that consideration can 
consist of the resolution of a dispute when there are unliquidated 
damages, even though the amount in dispute has not been precisely 
determined or one party may be mistaken as to the amount of the 
potential obligation settled thereby. International Motor Rebldcr. 
Co. vs. United Motor Exch.. 393 P.2d 992 (Kan. 1964). Further, 
settlement agreements are greatly favored by the law and should not 
easily be set aside. Lomas & Nettleton Co. vs. Tiger Enterprises, 
585 P.2d 949 (Idaho 1978). Therefore, to set aside the Settlement 
Agreement and Note, there would need to be finding that the alleged 
misrepresentation, if true, had a material effect which effected 
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the very essence of the agreement. Gump & Ayers has not shown any 
evidence of materiality. The District Court correctly concluded, 
as should this Court, that even assuming the existence of a 
misrepresentation concerning the status of the premises, that 
statement has not been shown to have a material effect on the 
settlement of an unliquidated liability and therefore Summary 
Judgment is proper in favor of Union Park. 
C. The ruling of the District Court should be upheld if it 
can be upheld on any proper theory. 
It is well established law that this Court should uphold the 
decision of the District Court if it can do so on any proper 
ground. Matter of Estate of Shepley, 645 P.2d 605 (Utah 1982). 
The Utah Supreme Court has gone so far as to say that this rule 
should be enforced even in cases where the lower court assigned a 
specific but incorrect reason for its ruling. 
In any event, we are inclined to affirm a 
trial court's decision whenever we can do so 
on proper grounds, even though the trial court 
may have assigned an incorrect reason for its 
ruling. 
Jesperson vs. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980). 
In the present case, the trial court could have granted Union 
Park's Motion for Summary Judgment, not only for Gump & Ayers1 
failure to produce clear and convincing evidence of a material 
misrepresentation, but also as a result of its total failure to 
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produce clear and convincing evidence on the other essential 
elements of fraud. 
There are nine (9) elements to be shown in support of an 
allegation of fraud. The elements of a fraudulent representation 
are: 
(1) That a representation was made; (2) 
concerning a presently existing material fact; 
(2) which was false; (4) which the representor 
either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made 
recklessly, knowing that he has insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such 
representation; (5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) 
that the other party, acting reasonably and in 
ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely 
upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; 
(9) to his injury and damage. 
Pace vs. Parrish. 247 P.2d 273, 274 (Utah 1952) as quoted in Wright 
vs. West Side Nursery. 787 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1990). 
Further, it is clearly the law that a party alleging fraud, 
even at the summary judgment stage, must produce evidence on each 
of the nine elements. Pace vs. Sagebrush Sales Co., 560 P.2d 789 
(Ariz. 1977). It is also clear that failure to support the 
elements of fraud with specific evidence is grounds for dismissing 
a claim of fraud on summary judgment. See. Norton vs. Blackham, 
669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983). 
Even assuming that misrepresentations were made as alleged, 
Gump & Ayers has not provided any evidence to support the other 
elements of fraud. Examination of the Affidavit of Jerry Floor 
filed in opposition to Union Park's Motion for Summary Judgment 
shows that Gump & Ayers has made no allegation that Gump & Ayers 
reasonably relied on the alleged representations, or that Union 
Park intended Gump & Ayers to rely thereon, or that Gump & Ayers 
has been damaged by its reasonable reliance. The Affidavits filed 
by Gump & Ayers which comprise the whole record of this matter, 
make no attempt to carry Gump & Ayers' substantive burden on these 
issues. 
Failure to allege a proper factual basis for reasonable 
reliance resulted in dismissal of the plaintiff's case in a summary 
judgment context in Sprunk vs. First Bank Western M. Missoula, 741 
P.2d 766 (Montana 1987). In Sprunk the plaintiff alleged through 
an affidavit that the defendant had made certain misrepresentations 
which induced execution of settlement arrangements on a prior debt. 
However, the plaintiff failed to set forth the specific false 
representations made. Id. at 769. The court also noted that the 
plaintiff failed to allege a factual basis which would support the 
element of reasonable reliance. Based upon the foregoing, the 
motion for summary judgment was granted and the plaintiff's 
complaint dismissed. In support of its ruling, the court repeated 
the Well established rule of law that fraud can never be presumed 
and the party carrying the burden of proof must produce evidence on 
each of the nine elements of fraud. Id. at 769. 
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It is undisputed that the entities involved in this action are 
both sophisticated corporations. In support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Union Park also submitted to the District Court 
the time sheets of the attorney representing Gump & Ayers, proving 
that Gump & Ayers was fully represented by counsel during the 
negotiation phase of the Settlement Agreement (R. 338-345). In 
addition, in the Settlement Agreement, Gump & Ayers acknowledged 
the advice of counsel (R. 106) . It is also clear that the parties 
to the Settlement Agreement were in an adverse position, each 
wanting to resolve the dispute between the parties on the most 
favorable basis possible. 
The only evidence placed before the District Court by Gump & 
Ayers, and relevant to the issue of reasonable reliance, is the 
bare conclusion set forth in the Affidavit of Jerry Floor, which 
reads: ,fIn negotiating the Settlement Agreement and Promissory 
Note, Gump & Ayers relied on the statement by Thomas Lloyd..." R. 
192) . 
It is well established law in Utah that a party resisting a 
Motion for Summary Judgment cannot rely on statements in an 
affidavit, which statements constitute unsupported conclusions of 
law. Specific facts in support of those conclusions must be set 
forth. Winter vs. Northwest Pipeline Corp.. 820 P.2d 916 (Utah 
1991). Conclusory allegations of fraud were determined to be 
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insufficient by the Utah Supreme Court in Norton vs. Blackham. 669 
P.2d 857 (Utah 1983). In the Norton case, the plaintiff was 
attempting to set aside a voluntary release in order to pursue a 
tort action. The Norton case was dismissed on summary judgment, 
which dismissal was upheld by the Utah Supreme Court because the 
plaintiff fs affidavit filed in opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment was conclusory, not alleging the specific underlying 
facts. Id. at 859. Gump & Ayers1 statement of reliance is 
likewise purely conclusory. Nothing was submitted for 
consideration which stated in what ways or manner Gump & Ayers 
reasonably relied. 
Further, Gump & Ayers has made absolutely no allegation that 
its reliance was reasonable. The undisputed facts establish that 
Gump & Ayers1 counsel participated in the negotiation and drafting 
of the Settlement Agreement and Gump & Ayers could have protected 
itself against the present eventuality through that Agreement by 
setting forth the factors upon which it was relying. Gump & Ayers 
has made no allegation that any set of circumstances precluded it 
from taking any of these steps. 
In fact, the Settlement Agreement which was executed by Gump 
& Ayers and in which its counsel was involved in drafting, clearly 
and unambiguously states as follows: 
7. Union Park and Gump & Ayers acknowledge 
that this compromise and release has been 
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entered into freely and with the advice of 
counsel and that no representations of fact or 
opinion have been made bv any party or bv 
anyone acting in their behalf to induce this 
compromise with respect to the nature of their 
claims and damages. (Emphasis added). 
(Addendum Exhibit "A"). 
By entering into a Settlement and Release Agreement with this 
language, Gump & Ayers specifically represented to Union Park that 
nothing that was said by Union Park had any effect upon their 
willingness to enter into the Settlement Agreement and execute the 
Promissory Note. Gump & Ayers specifically disclaimed its right to 
argue reliance and therefore should be estopped from raising the 
issue of reasonable reliance in attempting to avoid its obligations 
under the Settlement and Release Agreement. It is obvious that the 
District Court could have found that Gump & Ayers did not raise 
sufficient evidence of reasonable reliance in light of its 
contractual representation that it did not rely on any statements 
made on behalf of Union Park. Therefore, Summary Judgment in favor 
of Union Park could be upheld on this basis alone. 
Finally, Gump & Ayers did not allege that it relied to its 
detriment and suffered damages as a result thereof. The undisputed 
facts establish that if the Settlement Agreement had not been 
entered into, Gump & Ayers1 liability would have been larger, not 
smaller than agreed to. All of the evidence regarding Union Park's 
efforts to mitigate damages was before the District Court in Union 
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Park's original Memorandum and Affidavit Supporting Summary 
Judgment. None of that evidence was rebutted or challenged with 
contrary evidence by Gump & Ayers. Union Park's undisputed 
evidence established that, at a bare minimum, Gump & Ayers would 
owe Union Park in excess of $70,000.00 in future rents, were not 
for the Settlement Agreement. Thus, Gump & Ayers has completely 
failed to produce any evidence showing that it has been damaged. 
The rule was well stated by the United States Supreme Court in 
Celotex Corp. vs. Catrett. 106 S.Ct. 2548, 477 U.S. 321, 91 L.Ed. 
2d 265 (1986) that a party must produce evidence on every essential 
element of its case. 
...Rule 56 (c) mandates the entry of summary 
judgment... against a party who fails to make 
a showing sufficient to establish the 
existence of an element essential to that 
party's case, and on which that party will 
bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a 
situation, there can be "no genuine issue as 
to any material fact," since a complete 
failure of proof concerning an essential 
element of the non-moving party's case 
necessarily renders all other facts 
immaterial. 
Id. at 2552. 
Thus, Gump & Ayers1 total failure to produce any evidence 
regarding reasonable reliance, knowledge by Union Park that there 
would be reliance, or damages resulting from the reliance, is 
itself an appropriate basis on which to uphold the ruling of the 
District Court, as Gump & Ayers also failed to meet its substantive 
burden on these issues. Therefore, there has not been an adequate 
showing of fraud. 
POINT II 
GUMP & AYERS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND ITS ANSWER 
TO ALLEGE BOTH AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE AND A COUNTER CLAIM 
BASED UPON FRAUD WAS PROPERLY DENIED 
Gump & Ayers' Motion for Leave to Amend its Answer and to 
Assert a Counterclaim was properly denied. There are at least 
three (3) bases for upholding the District Court1s ruling. First, 
Gump & Ayers1 Motion was unsupported and would have worked a 
substantial prejudice on Union Park. Second, Gump & Ayers1 
recently claimed argument that it was in a Rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, paradox, is unsupportable. Third, contrary to the 
statements in Appellantfs brief, the District Court gave full 
consideration to Gump & Ayers1 allegations of fraud which were the 
substance of its Motion to Amend. 
A. Gump 6 Ayers1 Motion for Leave to Amend was unsupported 
and therefore properly denied by the District Court. 
On March 22, 1991
 # Gump & Ayers filed its Motion for Leave to 
File an Amended Answer and Counterclaim (R. 235). The Motion for 
Leave to Amend was unsupported by either affidavits or a 
memorandum. The Motion itself cites no legal authority or basis 
for the relief requested. The Motion reads, in its entirety, as 
follows: 
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Defendant moves the Court for its order 
granting leave to amend its Answer in this 
action and to file a Counterclaim. Copies of 
the proposed Amended Answer and Counterclaim 
are attached hereto. 
Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, governing 
motion practice in district courts requires a memorandum in support 
of all motions. 
All motions, except uncontested or ex parte 
matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum 
of points and authorities, appropriate 
affidavits, and copies of or citations by page 
number to relevant portions of depositions, 
exhibits or other documents relied upon in 
support of the motion. 
On May 7, 1991, Union Park filed a Memorandum in opposition to 
the Motion for Leave to Amend, which Memorandum complies with the 
requirements of Rule 4-501. It included a statement of facts 
supported by documentary evidence and references to the record in 
support of each fact alleged. It then set forth the standard of 
review for motions for leave to amend and legal argument that Gump 
& Ayers1 Motion for Leave to Amend should be denied. 
Pursuant to Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a party 
may amend its answer "only by leave of court or by written consent 
of the adverse party... when justice so requires11. Further, the 
standard to be considered when determining whether justice requires 
leave for amendment is undue prejudice. Bekins Bar V Ranch vs. 
Huth, 664 P.2d 455 (Utah 1983). These authorities were brought to 
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the attention of the Court through Union Park's responsive 
memorandum. Union Park further brought to the attention of the 
Court the prejudice it would suffer as a result of the requested 
amendment. 
Union Park commenced this action by filing a Complaint on 
November 16, 1990 (R. 2). The Defendant was served on November 23, 
1990 (R. 13) . The Defendant filed an Answer and simultaneously 
filed its First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production 
of Documents on December 13, 1990 (R. 14 and 18). Union Park 
responded to the discovery on January 14, 1991 (R. 19), and then 
waited five (5) weeks before filing its Motion for Summary Judgment 
(R. 50). Even after Union Park's Motion for Summary Judgment had 
been filed with the Court, the Defendant delayed an additional 
thirty (30) days prior to filing its Motion for Leave to Amend (R. 
50, 52 and 235). Union Park had prepared the Motion for Summary 
Judgment and the supporting documentation relevant thereto in 
reliance on the issues as framed by the pleadings on file at that 
time (R. 269) . Union Park showed the Court the prejudice it would 
suffer if the belated Motion for Leave to Amend were granted. 
Even after Union Park responded to the unsupported Motion for 
Leave to Amend, Gump & Ayers did not avail itself of its 
opportunity provided by Rule 4-501 (1) (c) to file a Reply 
Memorandum in support of its Motion. The unsupported Motion was 
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noticed-up for decision and decided by the Court on January 10, 
1992. The District Court exercised its broad discretion, which it 
has under Utah law, to deny the unsupported Motion. Westlev vs. 
Farmers Ins. Exchange, 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983). In light of 
the fact that the motion was unsupported by affidavits, facts, a 
memorandum, any authority or legal argument contradicting the 
facts, authority and arguments submitted by Union Park, it cannot 
be said that the District Court abused its broad discretion in 
denying the Motion. 
B. Gump 6 Ayers' delay in filing its Motion to Amend 
is not excusable. 
In its brief, Gump & Ayers argues extensively that it 
believed, since the inception of this action, that it had been the 
victim of a fraud. However, Gump & Ayers and its counsel go on to 
argue that they felt constrained, by the requirements of Rule 11, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to investigate the issue further 
before raising allegations of fraud. These statements, and this 
argument, are unsupported by the record. Gump & Ayers has been 
represented by the same counsel since the inception of this action. 
The record is clear that Gump & Ayers and its counsel have always 
felt that this was their only defense to Union Parkfs action. 
(See~ Affidavit of Jerry Floor at Paragraph 18) (R. 195). 
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Gump & Ayers would also have this Court believe that it 
finally learned of this fraud and promptly filed its Motion for 
Leave to Amend. Gump & Ayers argues: 
On March 21, 1992, Gump & Ayers filed a Motion 
to Amend its Answer to assert a Counterclaim 
alleging the fraud which was now confirmed. 
(Emphasis added). 
This statement is somewhat misleading. The record establishes that 
the "confirmation" to which Gump & Ayers refers is a copy of the 
Lease Agreement between Union Park and the substitute tenant, 
Matrix, Inc. This lease was produced to Gump & Ayers with Union 
Park's responses to their discovery requests, which responses were 
delivered on January 14, 1991, five (5) weeks before Union Park 
filed its Motion for Summary Judgment and over two (2) months 
before Gump & Ayers filed its Motion for Leave to Amend (R. 19). 
The record also establishes that Jerry Floor, President of Gump & 
Ayers, was aware of the circumstances which gave rise to his 
allegation of fraud, as far back as November 5, 1990. There is 
correspondence in the record, of that date, in which Mr. Floor sets 
forth all of the factual allegations which he now states constitute 
the basis of Gump & Ayers1 claim of fraudulent inducement (R. 275). 
In summary, while Gump & Ayers may argue that it felt 
restrained by Rule 11 from alleging fraud until such time as it had 
confirmation, this position is not supported by the record. On the 
contrary, the only evidence placed before the District Court was 
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that introduced by Union Park, all of which evidence supports Union 
Park's position that the information upon which Gump & Ayers bases 
its allegation of fraudulent inducement was known to it long before 
it filed its Motion for Leave to Amend. In light of this unexcused 
and unexplained delay, the District Court properly denied the 
Motion for Leave to Amend. See, Westley vs. Farmers Ins. Exchange. 
663 P.2d 93 (Utah 1983). 
C The District Court gave full consideration to all evidence 
of fraud, properly ruled that the evidence of fraud was 
insufficient as a matter of law, thereby rendering Defendant's 
Motion for Leave to Amend moot* 
Gump & Ayers now argues that denial of its Motion for Leave to 
Amend to include a claim for fraud prejudiced it because "the 
denial of the motion effectively removed all evidence of fraud from 
consideration by the lower court" (Appellee's Brief at Page 20). 
This argument is clearly contradicted by the record. To rebut this 
contention, a brief review of the procedural posture of the case is 
necessary. 
Though Union Parkfs Motion for Summary Judgment was filed 
sixty (60) days prior to Gump & Ayers1 Motion for Leave to Amend, 
both Motions were noticed-up for argument and decision on January 
10, 1992. At the hearing of January 10
 # 1992, the Court 
specifically stated as follows: 
The matter comes before the Court today on 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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There is also pending Defendant's Motion to 
Amend its Answer and assert a Counterclaim. 
(Addendum Exhibit HClf at Page 1). The Court went on to state that 
it believed the issues relevant to both the Motion for Summary 
Judgment and the Motion for Leave to Amend were intertwined 
(Addendum Exhibit "C" at Pages 2 and 3) . Counsel for Gump & Ayers 
stated his agreement, on the record, that the arguments were 
intertwined and that argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment 
would resolve all issues before the Court. 
Mr. McDonald: I think if we can hear the 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and then if the 
Court can open that up, I think Summary 
Judgment is going to really resolve 
everything. They are all related to that. 
(Addendum Exhibit "Clf at Page 4). 
Appellant1s only defense to the enforceability of the 
Promissory Note that it admitted signing, was the affirmative 
defense of fraud in the inducement. Consequently, the entirety of 
Mr. McDonald's argument at the hearing of January 10, 1992 was 
devoted to the issue of the alleged fraud, which Gump & Ayers now 
disengenuously argues was never considered by the Court. (Addendum 
Exhibit "C" at Pages 20-24 and 33). 
Finally, the District Court made it perfectly clear that it 
had given full consideration to Gump & Ayers1 arguments of the 
alleged fraud. The Court stated in its ruling "Frankly, I have 
given the fraud claim considerable thought" (emphasis added) (R. 
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437). The Court then went on to deny Gump & Ayers1 Motion for 
Leave to Amend as being moot in light of the fact that it granted 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. After concluding, as a 
matter of law that Gump & Ayers had not met its burden to show 
fraud, the Court stated that it would make no sense Mto turn around 
and say, "okay, now, amend your answer and include the counterclaim 
on this very issue"..." (R. 443). The Court reiterated its 
position in response to Mr. McDonald's question about the denial of 
Gump & Ayers1 Motion for Leave to Amend. 
Mr. McDonald: The problem I have, if the 
Motion to Amend is not granted, then fraud 
isn't before the Court on Summary Judgment. 
The Court: Well, you defend [sic] it on that 
basis and I considered it in that context. It 
was a pending motion I reserved on that. I 
indicated that I had read all of the pleadings 
about it. Motion to amend is denied. 
(R. 443). 
Thus, Gump & Ayers1 contention that it was prejudice by denial 
of its Motion for Leave to Amend is unsupported by the record and 
meritless. Denial of the Motion did not prevent the Court from 
considering evidence of alleged fraud in the context of Union 
Park's Motion for Summary Judgment. Gump & Ayers' allegations of 
fraud were at the very heart of its opposition to the Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Court having found that Gump & Ayers did not 
meet its substantive burden on the allegations of fraud, properly 
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granted Union Parkfs Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court then 
correctly decided that Gump & Ayers1 Motion for Leave to Amend was 
therefore moot and properly denied Appellant's Motion. These 
rulings should be upheld by this Court. 
POINT I?I 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT INTEREST ON THE 
PROMISSORY NOTE WAS TO BE CALCULATED AT THE RATE OF 
10% PER ANNUM 
At the hearing of January 10, 1992 on Plaintiff's first Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Judgment was granted in favor of Union Park 
on the issue of liability. The Court reserved for further 
proceedings the issues regarding determination of the appropriate 
interest rate to be used in calculating the balance due and owing 
on the Note. The Court also reserved for further proceedings the 
propriety of attorney's fees as an element of damages (R. 470, 
471) . These issues were addressed by Plaintiff fs Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed on August 25, 1992 (R. 474). Union Park's 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment was supported by a Memorandum, 
as well as the Affidavit of Thomas Lloyd in support thereof (R. 477 
and 502). After obtaining an extension, Gump & Ayers filed a 
Memorandum in Opposition supported by the Affidavit of Jerry Floor 
(R. 549 and 553). Gump & Ayers also filed a Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the issue of the propriety of calculating the 
note interest at the rate of 10% per annum (R. 566). Oral argument 
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on the cross-motions was held on November 30, 1992. The Court 
granted Union Park's Motion for Summary Judgment on these issues 
and denied Gump & Ayers1 Cross-Motion (R. 606). The Court properly 
ruled that interest on the note was to be calculated at the rate of 
10% per annum. 
Union Park presented evidence through the Affidavit of Tom 
Lloyd (R. 502) of the principal balance which remained due and 
owing under the Note, which evidence was unopposed. Union Park 
also presented evidence supporting its claim to late fees and 
attorneyfs fees. Union Park prevailed on all of these issues (R. 
606), none of which were appealed by Gump & Ayers. 
However, Gump & Ayers continues to resist the ruling of the 
Court that interest on the undisputed unpaid balance is to be 
calculated on a per annum basis. 
It is undisputed that the language of the Note provides for 
interest at the rate of 10% (R. 8) . Relevant portions of the Note 
read as follows: 
This Note shall bear interest at the rate of 
10% from and after May 1, 1988. Said sum 
shall be due and payable to the holder hereof 
in eighteen (18) monthly payments of principal 
in the amount of $3,055.55, plus accrued 
interest as of the date of each such payment. 
(Addendum Exhibit flBft) . The dispute arose as to the period over 
which the interest should be calculated. In response to Union 
Park's Motion for Summary Judgment and in support of its own Cross-
50 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Gump & Ayers argued that interest was 
to be calculated at the rate of 10% per every forty-two (42) months 
(R. 569) which it calls a "flat rate". Union Park argued that 10% 
was to be calculated as a per annum interest rate (R. 580) based 
upon application of § 15-1-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
The Court clearly ruled that the Note does not state the time 
period over which interest is to be calculated. 
And in this particular case, the language that 
is relevant to the interest rate makes no 
mention of a per annum interest rate. It 
doesn't make mention of a flat rate interest 
rate either. I don't think there is any 
ambiguity about that contract in and of 
itself, just that it's missing a term. 
(R. 744, also Addendum Exhibit "D"). In supplying the missing 
term, the District Court properly inserted the term "per annum" 
into the contract. 
There is a Utah statute which prescribes the period over which 
interest is to be calculated when none is stated. In that 
situation, a per annum interest rate is required under § 15-1-3, 
Utah Code Ann.. (1953 as amended), which provides: 
Whenever in any... instrument... any certain 
rate of interest is mentioned and no period of 
time is stated, interest shall be calculated 
at the rate mentioned bv the year. (Emphasis 
added). 
Research reveals no cases which have cited or interpreted 
§ 15-1-3. However, the State of Oklahoma has a statute which is 
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analogous to the Utah statute which has been interpreted by the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court, The Oklahoma statute reads in its entirety 
as follows: 
When a rate of interest is prescribed by a law 
or contract, without specifying the period of 
time by which such rate is to be calculated, 
it is to be deemed an annual rate. 
Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit., 15 § 265. 
This statute was interpreted by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
in the case of Jackson vs. Fennemore. 230 P. 689 (Okla. 1924), in 
which enforcement was sought of a promissory note which accrued 
interest at the rate of "...10% interest from date". Like the Note 
before this Court, it specified the percentage rate of interest and 
the date after which interest was to accrue. However, it did not 
specify the period pursuant to which the 10% rate was to be 
calculated. Id. at 690. This is identical to the present case in 
which the Note provides for interest at the rate of 10% and a date 
certain after which it is to accrue (May 1, 1988) (R. 8). Under 
these circumstances, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma determined that 
no period for calculation was provided in the note and it relied on 
the statute cited above in ruling that interest was to be 
calculated on a "per annum" basis. The court specifically stated: 
This [referring to 15 § 265] we think is 
decisive of the question raised, and is ample 
to justify the court in rendering judgment for 
10% per annum... (Emphasis added). 
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Id. at 691. 
The District Court properly determined that the period over 
which the 10% interest was to be calculated was a missing term (R. 
744). The Court then noted that generally a court will not insert 
missing terms into a contract, as a matter of law. However, it 
will make such an insertion when the legislature, through statutory 
enactment, has mandated a particular term to be inserted. 
Thereupon, and in reliance on § 15-1-3, the Court ruled that 
interest was to be calculated at the rate of 10% per annum. The 
court specifically stated: 
As I look at the statute, and looking at this 
Promissory Note, it appears to me that the 
Plaintifffs position is well taken. That the 
statute does control in this case, does 
provide the court a justification for 
inserting a term in the contract. The parties 
are not entitled to a better contract than the 
one that they entered into, and generally 
courts do not imply terms or read terms or add 
terms to a contract. But in this case, I 
think the legislature has done just that. 
(R. 745, also Addendum Exhibit WD M). The District Court properly 
applied the statute to supply the missing term, since contracts are 
presumed to incorporate within their terms law existing at the time 
the contract is entered into. McKinlev vs. Prudential Property and 
Cas. Ins. Co. , 619 P.2d 1269 (Okla. App. 1980), Beehive Medical 
Electronics, Inc. vs. Industrial Com'n. 583 P.2d 53 (Utah 1978) and 
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Ouaaliana vs. Exquisite Home Builders. Inc., 638 P.2d 301 (Utah 
1975). 
The Note states the percentage interest rate of 10%. The Note 
also states the date on which interest begins to accrue (May 1, 
1988). However, the Note does not state the time period over which 
interest is to be calculated. There is no possible way to 
interpret the Note and make sense of all of its remaining 
provisions if a "flat" rate is imposed. Appellant offers no method 
of calculating a "flat rate" nor offers how its interpretation is 
consistent with the other provisions of the Note. However, by 
inserting the "per annum" period prescribed by § 15-1-3, the Note 
makes sense. It makes the following language of the Note 
consistent and logical: 
Said sum shall be due and payable to the 
holder hereof in eighteen (18) monthly 
payments of principal in the amount of 
$3,055.55 plus accrued interest as of the date 
of each such payment. (Emphasis added). 
(Addendum Exhibit "B"). The Utah statute prescribes that, if such 
a term is missing, interest is to be calculated on an annual basis. 
Therefore, the Courtfs ruling that the "period" term of the Note 
was missing was proper and the Court correctly ruled that interest 
on the undisputed unpaid principal should be calculated on a per 
annum basis. This ruling should be affirmed by this Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the two rulings of the Third Judicial 
District Court in favor of Plaintiff Union Park Associates in 
connection with its Motion for Summary Judgment. First, this Court 
should conclude that the District Court properly found Gump & Ayers 
liable under the Settlement Agreement and Promissory Note. In so 
doing, this Court should affirm that the District Court properly 
applied the substantive burden test by resolving all disputes of 
fact in favor of Gump & Ayers and thereafter finding that Gump & 
Ayers still failed to show fraud by clear and convincing evidence, 
thereby failing to raise a material issue to defeat Summary 
Judgment. Even if this Court declines to adopt the substantive 
burden test, it should still affirm the ruling on liability as Gump 
& Ayers still failed to raise a material issue of fact. 
Second, this Court should find that the District Court 
properly considered Gump & Ayers1 allegations of fraud and properly 
denied its Motion for Leave to Amend. 
Third, this Court should affirm the ruling of the District 
Court granting damages in favor of Union Park and specifically 
finding that interest under the Promissory Note should accrue at a 
rate of 10% per annum. In so doing, this Court should affirm the 
Order and Judgment (R. 606) wherein Plaintiff was awarded Judgment 
as against Defendant in the amount of $35,175.59 as of July 9, 
55 
1990, with interest accruing thereon at the rate of 10% per annum 
thereafter until paid in full, together with the award of 
attorney's fees and costs in the total amount of $7,220.50, plus 
interest thereon at the contract rate of 10% per annum from the 
date of entry of Judgment until paid in full. 
Further, Union Park Associates is entitled to its attorney's 
fees and costs pursuant to the Note between the parties. 
Therefore, this matter should be remanded to the District Court for 
determination and award of additional costs and additional 
attorney's fees incurred in responding to this Appeal. (See, 
G.G.A. , Inc. vs. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1989)). 
Finally, Gump & Ayers has posted a Supersedeas Bond pursuant to 
which Union Park Associates is stayed from execution pending 
outcome of this Appeal. That Stay should be lifted and the Bond 
should be released to Union Park Associates forthwith. 
DATED this day of May, 1993. 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
mark S. Swan 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
Union Park Associates 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^j^ day of May, 1993, I caused 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon the 
following parties by placing the same in the United States mails, 
postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Robert M. McDonald 
MCDONALD, WEST & BENSON 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
455 East 500 South 
Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
AND 
MUTUAL RELEASE OF CLAIMS 
This Settlement Agreement/and Mutual Release of Claims is 
entered into this 7th day ofNfelQyembQr, 1988, by and between 
Union Park Associates (hereinafter, "Union Park") and Gump & 
Ayers Real Estate, Inc. (hereinafter, "Gump & Ayers"). 
1. On June 28, 1985, Union Park, as landlord, and Gump & 
Ayers, as tenant, entered into a certain Lease Agreement for the 
lease of approximately 912 sq. ft. of the second floor of the 
office building located at approximately 1150 East Fort Union 
Boulevard, Midvale, Utah. That Lease Agreement provides for a 
term of eight years and eight months. A copy of said Lease is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "B" 
2. On June 1, 1983, Union Park, as landlord, and Gump & 
Ayers, as tenant, entered into a certain Lease Agreement for the 
lease of approximately 4,567 sq. ft. of the second floor of the 
office building located at approximately 1150 East Forth Union 
Boulevard, Midvale, Utah. That Lease Agreement provides for a 
term of ten years and eight months. A copy of said Lease is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "C". 
AGREEMENT AND RELEASE OF CLAIMS 
In consideration of the mutual promises set forth below and 
with the intent of being legally bound, the parties hereto agree 
as follows: 
3. Payment. Upon execution of this Agreement, (a) Gump & 
Ayers will pay to Union Park the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars 
($10,000); (b) on December 15, 1988, Gump & Ayers will pay to 
Union Park an additional sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000); 
in addition, (c) Upon the execution of this Agreement Gump & 
Ayers will execute and deliver to Union Park a Promissory Note in 
the form attached hereto as Exhibit "A", and will pay to Union 
Park the additional sum of Fifty-Five Thousand Dollars ($55,000) 
on the terms, and in the manner, set forth in said Promissory 
Note. 
4. Mutual General Releases. (a) For and in consideration 
of the mutual covenants contained herein and other good and 
valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is 
hereby acknowledged, Union Park, for itself, its successors and 
assigns, does hereby fully and forever release, acquit and 
discharge Gump & Ayers, its successors, assigns and any others 
who have acted or who are acting on its behalf, from any and all 
claims, demands, obligations, liabilities, causes of action or 
any suits at law or equity, whether known or unknown to Union 
Park, which Union Park may have against Gump & Ayers which claims 
arise from any act or omission of Gump & Ayers committed prior to 
the date of this Agreement, the Lease Agreements specified in 
Paragraphs Nos. 1 and 2, above, the occupation of the leased 
premises by Gump & Ayers and/or the use of the leased premises by 
Gump Sc Ayers. 
(b) For and in consideration of the mutual covenants 
contained herein and other good and valuable consideration, the 
receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, Gump & 
Ayers, for itself, its successors and assigns, does hereby fully 
and forever release, acquit and discharge Union Park, its 
successors, assigns and any others who have acted or who are 
acting on its behalf from any and all claims, demands, 
obligations, liabilities, causes of action or any suits at law or 
equity, whether known or unknown to Gump & Ayers which Gump & 
Ayers may have against Union Park which claims arise from any act 
or omission of Union Park, the Lease Agreements specified in 
paragraphs Nos. 1 and 2, above, the occupation of the leased 
premises by Gump & Ayers and the use of the leased premises by 
Gump & Ayers. 
5. Rescission of Lease. For the consideration of the 
covenants contained herein, the parties agree that the lease 
agreements specified in paragraphs nos. 1 and 2, above, are 
hereby mutually rescinded and that except as provided in this 
agreement, both parties are hereby released from any and all 
obligation contained within said lease agreements. 
6. Default. In the event Gump & Ayers shall default in a 
payment of $10,000.00 due on December 15, 1988 as set forth in 
paragraph 3 above, such payments shall be subject to a late 
charge at a rate equal to 18 percent per annum until paid. Any 
default in the payment of any sum set forth in the Promissory 
Note shall be subject to the late fee as set forth within the 
Promissory Note. In the event either party defaults in the 
performance of any term of this Agreement, the defaulting party 
agrees to pay all reasonable attorney's fees and court costs 
incurred by the non-defaulting party. 
The mutual releases contained herein and the mutual recision 
of the Lease Agreements contained herein are dependant upon the 
full performance by Gump & Ayers of its obligations contained in 
this Agreement and contained in the Promissory Note. In the 
event Gump & Ayers defaults in any of its obligations set forth 
in this Agreement or the performance of any obligation set forth 
in the Promissory Note, Union Park Associates shall be entitled, 
by its election, to retain all funds received prior to the 
default and to either (1) its actual damages under the Lease 
Agreements less all funds received under this Agreement and 
Promissory Note prior to the default or (2) the full 
consideration a6 provided in thi6 agreement and the Promissory 
Notes. 
7. Union Park and Gump & Ayers acknowledge that this 
2 
compromise and release has been entered into freely and with the 
advice of counsel and that no representations of fact or opinion 
has been made by either party or by anyone acting in their behalf 
to induce this compromise with respect to the nature of their 
claims and damages. 
DATED this lT day of •Move.mbeg/ 1988. 
UNION PARK ASSOCIATES 
By 
GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC. 
Id uniogump.rel 
EXHIBIT "B 
PROMISSORY NOTE 
$55,000.00 December -Movombeg _ 7 _ , 1988 
Principal Amount 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned hereby promises to pay 
to the order of UNION PARK ASSOCIATES, 6925 Union Park Center, 
Suite 500, Midvale, Utah 84047, the sum of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND 
AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($55,000.00). This note shall bear interest 
at the rate of ten percent (10%) from and after May 1, 1988. 
Said sum shall be due and payable to the holder hereof in 
eighteen (18) monthly payments of principal in the amount of 
$3,055.55 plus accrued interest as of the date of each such 
payment. 
Said payments to be made as follows: Payments shall 
commence on May 1, 1989 and continue thereafter, on the first day 
on each successive month, through and including the month of 
October, 1989. No payment shall be due for the months of 
November, 1989 through April, 1990. Thereafter, payments shall 
be due, as stated above, commencing on May 1, 1990 and continuing 
thereafter, on the first day of each successive month through and 
including the month of October, 1990. No payment shall be due 
for the months of November, 1990 through April, 1991. 
Thereafter, payments shall be due as stated above, commencing on 
May 1, 1991 and continuing thereafter on the 1st day of each 
successive month until all principal and accrued interest is paid 
in full. 
This note may be prepaid in whole or in part without 
penalty. 
This note shall at the option of any holder hereof be 
immediately due and payable upon the occurrence of any of the 
following: 
1. Failure to make any payment due hereunder within 15 days 
of its due date. 
2. Brea< .: of any condition of the Security Agreement on 
property granted as collateral or security for this note. 
3. Upon the filing by the undersigned of an assignment for 
the benefit of creditors, bankruptcy, or for relief under any 
provisions of the Federal Bankruptcy Code; or by suffering an 
involuntary petition in bankruptcy or receivership to be filed 
and not vacated within 30 days. 
In the event this note shall be in default, and placed with 
an attorney for collection, then the undersigned agrees to pay 
all reasonable attorney fees and costs of collection. Payments 
not made within five (5) days of due date shall be subject to a 
late charge of-1.5% of said payment. All payments hereunder 
shall be made to the address set forth above or to such address 
as may from time to time be designated by any holder hereof. 
The undersigned agrees to remain fully bound hereunder until 
this note shall be fully paid. The undersigned further waives 
demand, presentment and protest and all notices thereto and 
further agrees*to remain bound, notwithstanding any extension, 
modification, waiver or other indulgence by any holder or upon 
the exchange, substitution, or release of any collateral granted 
as security for this note. No modification or indulgence by any 
holder hereof shall be binding unless in writing; and any 
indulgence on any one occasion shall not be an indulgence for any 
other future occasion. The rights of any holder hereof shall be 
cumulative and not necessarily successive. This note shall be 
construed, governed and enforced in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah. 
This note is subject to a Security Agreement of even date. 
GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC. 
President 
Id uniogump.not 
EXHIBIT "C 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UNION PARK ASSOCIATES 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC. 
Defendant. 
Transcript of: 
HEARING 
Case No. 900906725 
The above-entitled cause of action came on 
regularly for hearing before the Honorable Anne M. Stirba. 
a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of the State 
of Utah, at Salt Lake County, Utah, on Friday, January 10, 
1992. 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
MARK S. SWAN 
RICHER. SWAN & OVERHOLT 
311 South State #350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
ROBERT M. MCDONALD 
MCDONALD & BULLEN 
455 East 500 South #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
1 FRIDAY, JANUARY 10, 1992 2 :00 P.M. 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 THE COURT: Good afternoon. Let's go on the 
4 record in the matter of Union Park vs. Gump & Ayers Real 
5 Estate, Incorporated, case No. 900906725. Counsel, would 
6 you state your appearances. 
7 MR. SWAN: Mark Swan representing the 
8 plaintiff, Union Park Associates. 
9 MR. MCDONALD: Robert McDonald representing the 
10 defendant, Gump & Ayers. 
11 THE COURT: All right, thank you. The matter 
12 comes before the Court today on the Plaintiff's Motion 
13 for Summary Judgment. There is also pending Defendant's 
14 Motion to Amend its Answer and Assert a Counterclaim. 
15 There is a Motion for Relief in Judgment which the 
16 plaintiff filed following the Court's ruling, I believe, 
17 on July 18 of 1991. 
18 I indicated by way of minute entry that I would 
19 reconsider that motion for the reason that although the 
20 docket sheet indicated that a Memorandum in Opposition 
21 had been filed by the plaintiffs, that the memorandum was 
22 not a part of the file and consequently was not 
I i. 
23 considered by the Court at the time I issued that ruling 
24 on July the 18th. So I would reconsider that. I 
25 indicated by way of minute entry that I would. 
I presume that the parties haven't been able to 
reach some kind of an agreement about that; is that 
correct? 
MR. SWAN: Well, Your Honor, our Motion to 
Reconsider your order granting the Motion to Amend has 
not been opposed. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. SWAN: So I presume that there is no 
problem with that. I think it is a court clerical error 
that the order was ever entered because clearly the 
memorandum was on file and for somehow it got lost 
because it had never been put on the computer. 
THE COURT: I have already said I am going to 
reconsider it, but I was wondering, I presume there has 
been no agreement then with respect to the Motion to 
Amend the amendment? 
MR. SWAN: That is correct, there has not been. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. MCDONALD: I, think it is still disputed and 
we will address that. 
THE COURT: Still seems very much in dispute. 
What we are going to do today with that is I am going to 
reserve ruling on that particular issue until after 
argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment. I don't 
think we need to rule to have argument specifically with 
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1 the Motion to Amend. I am aware of how the issues 
2 intertwine. I would like you to argue the Motion for 
3 Summary Judgment. I have read all of the affidavits. I 
4 have read your memoranda on that, and you may proceed. 
5 MR. SWAN: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, 
6 if it please the Court, I am going to stand here because 
7 I have so many documents that I may need to refer to in 
8 this oral statement. 
9 THE COURT: Just as long as Dorothy can hear 
10 you and I can hear you. 
11 MR. SWAN: Okay. Well I usually talk loud 
12 enough. It is usually too fast, so I will try to keep it 
13 slow. 
14 I think it is important in conjunction with 
15 this whole matter, because I think there are six motions 
16 before the Court, to understand the timetable of the 
17 pleadings and procedure in this matter. 
18 THE COURT: Six motions? 
19 MR. SWAN: I think so, yes. 
20 THE COURT: I think there is the Motion for 
21 Summary Judgment, Motion to Amend, and then the Motion 
22 for Consideration to Relief of Judgment. I am not aware 
23 of other motions. 
24 MR. SWAN: There is Motions to Strike 
25 Affidavits, Motions for Protective Order, Motions to 
1 Compel, and all of these things are part and parcel, 
2 I really > of the controversy surrounding the Hot ion for 
3 Summary Judgment. 
4 THE COURT: When was the Motion to Strike — 
5 Oh, the affidavit of John Parsons. 
6 MR. SWAN: That is correct. 
7 THE COURT: All right, very well. 
8 MR. SWAN: Anyway, if I may — 
9 THE COURT: Was there a Notice to Submit 
10 submitted on the Motion to Compel? 
11 MR. SWAN: I think this is the Defendant's 
12 ] Motion to Compel. I am not sure whether there waB or 
13 not. 
14 MR. MCDONALD: The way that arose, Your Honor, 
15 is we submitted some discovery and I believe there was a 
16 motion that inasmuch as the summary judgment was pending, 
17 that they ought not to have to answer that until the 
18 disposition of the motion, if I recall correctly. And 
19 basically I think we are.really dust here. I think if we 
20 can hear the Motion for Summary Judgment, and then if the 
21 Court can open that up, I think the summary judgment is 
22 I going to really resolve everything. They are all related 
23 to that. 
24 THE COURT: All right, go ahead. 
25 MR. SWAN: Thank you, Your Honor. As the Court 
1 is probably well aware, the complaint in this matter was 
2 filed on November 14, 1990, a little over a year ago. It 
3 was served on November 23rd. The defendants filed an 
4 Answer on December 13th. With their Answer, they filed 
5 their first set of Interrogatories and Requests for 
6 Production of Documents. And then my client responded to 
7 those and the responses were filed or the Certificate of 
8 Service was filed January 10th, so within the 30-day 
9 period. Nothing happened after that response to the 
10 discovery and so on February 21st, 40 days later or so, 
11 we filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Thereafter, a 
12 month later — 
13 THE COURT: I believe it was January, not 
14 February, but go ahead, I thought it was. 
15 MR. SWAN: Motion for Summary Judgment? 
16 THE COURT: Well, never mind. It doesn't 
17 matter. 
18 MR. SWAN: My motion says February 21st. 
19 THE COURT: Okay, you are right. 
20 MR. SWAN: So some time period passed from our 
21 Answer to the motion, and I think that becomes relevant 
22 if we ever get to the Motion to Amend issue because there 
23 was plenty of time for the defendants to amend their 
24 pleadings before filing a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
25 They responded to our Motion for Summary 
Judgment on March 21st, and at the same time filed a 
Motion to Amend on the same date. 
Our Motion for Summary Judgment, I think, is 
quite straightforward. And I realize the Court has dust 
an enormous amount of paper and, to be honest with you, 
part of that was done to help educate the defendant as to 
the numbers behind this whole case; but I think the legal 
issues are quite easy. 
What is at issue is whether or not the 
defendant is liable under a promissory note which was 
executed as part of the whole Settlement Agreement 
package. The promissory note was executed on December 8, 
1988 in a principal amount of $55,000. It bears interest 
at 10 percent and it has an interesting payment schedule: 
18 payments of $3,055.55, but they're not monthly 
payments. They are skip-months in there and those 
payments are identified as principal payments. The way 
the note is written, in addition to the principai 
payments, you are supposed to pay accrued interest with 
that payment as of the date of the payments. 
The Settlement Agreement was executed because 
the defendant had entered into a commercial lease 
agreement with the plaintiff to lease premises at Union 
Park in Midvale. And there are two leases, one was eight 
years and one was ten years on two separate suites. They 
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vacated the premises in May of 1988, leaving at least six 
years left on the lease. A Settlement Agreement was 
finally executed eight months after they vacated the 
premises and there was eight months' rent due at the 
time. The rental payment due at the time on the total 
amount of premises being leased by the defendant was 
$7,733.37. 
The Settlement Agreement says that the parties 
are releasing each other of all of their rights and 
obligations under the lease agreement and for any number 
of known claims in exchange for the defendant paying the 
plaintiff a total of $65,000: $10,000 down, and 
execution of a promissory note. 
At the time of the execution of that promissory 
note and Settlement Agreement, the total amount due in 
past due rent was $61,866.96. And so what the defendant 
was agreeing to do was pay the $65,000:
 pay $61,000 for 
past due rent, and a small portion for future liability, 
slightly over $3,000. 
Their potential pliability under the lease was a 
half million dollars. 
THE COURT: You are just saying that that is 
accord and satisfaction? 
MR. SWAN: That is correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
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1 MR. SWAN: Now the defendant does not dispute 
2 the most recent accounting submitted by a supplemental 
3 affidavit of Tom Lloyd regarding the amount due under the 
4 promissory note. In their initial response, they 
5 provided evidence of some payments that we have now taken 
6 into account and have filed a supplemental accounting and 
7 have come up with a figure that is due under the 
8 promissory note of $35,352.46 as of July 16, 1990. 
9 We have also filed an affidavit of fees and 
10 costs through June 6, 1991 of $4,083.50. 
11 THE COURT: How much was that? 
12 MR. SWAN: $4,083.50. Now some additional fees 
13 and costs have been incurred since that date. 
14 Their defense to liability is not that they 
15 didn't sign the note or not that they paid in full. In 
16 fact, they admit that they have not paid in full: but it 
17 is fraud in the inducement. That is the term that they 
18 used. And their own Memorandum in Opposition says that 
19 "In order to induce Gump & Ayers to pay a sum of money 
20 for future rents, plaintiff falsely stated to Gump & 
21 Ayers the leased premises were still vacant, with no 
22 prospect of future tenants." So that is the allegation 
I i 
23 of fraud in the inducement, that they were induced to pay 
24 this $3,100 for future rents by the statement that the 
25 premises were vacant. We believe that this defense is 
8 
not well supported either at law or by the evidence that 
they have raised. 
First of all, we think the Settlement Agreement 
expressly waives each and every claim, including this 
claim that they were not told about the current status of 
the tenancy of the property. Secondly, we do not think 
that their fraud in the inducement claim is sufficiently 
pled by law because they have not pled each of the 
elements. Nor have they shown by the clear and 
convincing evidence requirement that they have, that 
there was a fraud. 
Settlement Agreements such as were entered into 
in this matter, have been construed quite often by the 
Utah Court and by other courts, and they have all been 
said to be favored at law. They are valued because they 
resolve disputes that have unliquidated liability, such 
as was with this case. There was not a very good ability 
to determine the defendant's continuing liability on the 
lease and so Settlement Agreement liquidated that 
liability. 
The case law also suggests, as cited in our 
memorandum, that in order to set aside the Settlement 
Agreement, the very strongest reasons must be shown and 
only by clear and convincing evidence. If I might refer 
to the Settlement Agreement, there are two paragraphs I 
9 
I which says, "Gump & Ayere 
assigns does hereby full 
discharge Union Park a,.,; i: 
others who have acted 
itself - successors 
u-jessv.i.. assigns, .juid 
- acting on its behalf 
, .aui, . * •: w. .auses of r- .Uuu, i - ..» oui* » at law ~~ 
equitv. whether know* unknown t. lumi \ .Lyers, which 
Alsc .:, 
paragraph 7 sayp 
; - t\w- \ Agreement 
Park and Gump & Ayers 
entered into freely and with the a: i e o; -ounsel and 
tha*- *-- representations of fact o:- opinio^ • r-j r---*"-- made 
"by ' . I U I L ' J : t » a i t i , in I ," iiMuvLiiiL u c 1 1 . . . . - t :: 
induce this compromise w ith respect * hr naturf- of 
uieir claims and damages." 
So on ti le ox le hand we ha .J^I:.;. . Ayers saying 
w*- \aven t relied on anything that Union Park has said in 
~ \ter; c - * ~ compromise agreemen n 
.-*y :.w.'. oe^:, askea t.^  pav. they are say,,^ :ne\ :.ave 
been fraudulent!, :nduced t 
" - *- -me i * 
, l O U H ^ i o l c u l o i . k * S i g n i n g a u u i l l l a u l .. o c ; w l . ; r V 
did:. . r ely , they cannot now change their mind and say, 
10 
1 MWe did rely." I think it is also important that they 
2 are a sophisticated company. They admit they had advice 
3 of counsel and were fully informed. 
4 The fraud by which the defendant is alleging 
5 that the plaintiff committed must be pled with 
6 particularity. Fraud in the inducement have four 
7 elements as identified in our memorandum. False 
8 representation, which is known to be false, or an 
9 omission of a material fact to induce action, and actual 
10 and justifiable reliance. And this must be known by 
11 clear and convincing evidence even in contesting a Motion 
12 for Summary Judgment. 
13 The only false representation that is raised by 
14 this defendant is raised by Jerry Floor's affidavit in 
15 paragraph 7 where he says it was falsely represented to 
16 him that the property was vacant. They have not raised 
17 any fact that shows that the property was not vacant at 
18 the time that he alleges the representation was made. 
19 THE COURT: So your position is that can"t be 
20 fraud in the inducement? 
21 MR. SWAN: That is correct. 
22 THE COURT: Even if true? 
23 MR. SWAN: Correct, because he is saying, "I 
24 relied on the fact that it was vacant." If it was 
25 vacant, there has been no misstatement, no misleading 
11 
statemenx „ uncontrovei I i I iui I t\ in i I lit i i . i>>-1 i <"> r 
vacant - 1 leged b:1 me bha b bhe statement was made 
nil Il I I "P fjiiv nooupanrv mil 11 January oi tue 
following year. 
But I think more importantly than whether 
^- ^ * "
 ui.----^  use 
be materia ^v^. oOL^ citeci upon i.v 
negotiations . r t h- agreement between the parties. And 
1 in 1 
changed their decision-making process at nil, 
THE COURT >*• - that statement that 
in i « E > e i 
vacant, tell me what time period exactly you are talking 
about? 
1 !! I! S i J ! \ t I • It 1 IE' II • s a ? Il ' 1 il • ; £ I::. I • U \ I I I Ji: I , 
discussions in November of 1988 at the time the 
Settlement Agreement was beinc discussed, that IIP was 
vacant M tr^t r:n- -• wr nelie-w tha: ir, :~. *r . ne was 
L O ± U truthfrV-** that :* ••:• - vacant u -• =.<=. ,~,r^ ;v * ,; 3 
;ou s*-^  * n- *-f, . •• scope -r ; ne Settlement Agreement. It 
statement has y hearing ~ • rV,~- \z^-\ dated 
amount that wa^ aeret- to and /*.*i*s tor past a^e it-riis. 
At most, it had some effect on what they were agreeing 
:l 2 
1 pay for future liability. And the facts are clear that 
2 they only agreed to pay $3,100 on future liability to get 
3 release from a potential half million dollars of 
4 liability. There is no showing that that statement would 
5 have had any effect on their decision to pay $3,100 for 
6 future rents. In fact, four-tenths of a month's rent is 
7 what they agreed to pay to compromise their future 
8 liability. 
9 Now, there is some implication that the 
10 plaintiff should have told the defendant that they were 
11 negotiating for a new tenant and thereby, although it is 
12 not explicitly stated, that maybe Union Park had a duty 
13 to speak and to keep the defendant informed of these 
14 other negotiations for tenancy of the property. 
15 THE COURT: Well, if I understand you 
16 correctly, Mr. Swan, your position is not only is there 
17 no duty but, in fact, if anything, there was a duty to 
18 try to mitigate, is that right, damages by attempting to 
19 re-let the property? 
20 MR. SWAN: That is correct. The case that says 
21 that there is a duty to mitigate is, I think, it is Reed 
22 vs. Mutual of Omaha case which didn't come down until 
23 after the Settlement Agreement. And so it wasn't clear 
24 in the State of Utah whether there was an actual duty to 
25 mitigate, but at least the plaintiff was doing something. 
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3 knd n ill ifcy to er^?> ^equirer -t-h^ 4* ^^^re must be either a 
* "iduciary duty betwe i • n^ parties r * o p a c i t y to 
* • -i- - endant hasn't said that there is a 
£ fiduciary duty. T>^r*- *r^ n- t r^ r *-- allegei **-+ +-ere 
6 . \ ; 
"t adversarial. The defendant - plaint itt money ana 
E they were try:Hc uu resolve a conflict. j.uau 10 not 
£ fiduciary. "• • 
There was . -n*! ; : - •, * a s s e r t undue i n f l u e n c e , 
p a r t i e s . ^ r - - - ?en t "hat t l - , ' 
ounsel . * - , > -^ v... understanding *. f 
. »- situatioi :,rre it-; :\ : nr : s -...eged that there is 
suggests that statute creates a specific duty 
keu> — e plain" If" informed. 
standard o£ a Kuie :>r Motion for Summary Judgment, there 
n^v ,. *• n terial fact - ^ -' + * o+- v- , 
materiality -r -.. They have not P*. . .. materially 
They 1 it i e nc • t shown how i t affected their * ?3ion, as 
fraud allega tioi i s iiiiis t • ::l :: • f i n I " u» W P . hat. W R 
have an enforceable accord and satisfactior r!ey admit 
they hfive defaul ted undei I Iin, I, accor d ~ 
14 
1 They do not dispute the amount that is due. 
2 Attorney's fees are allowed under the note. 
3 The accord and satisfaction waives the very claim that 
4 they are now making that they were not relying on 
5 representations, where in fact now they are alleging they 
6 were doing so. And most basically, there is just no 
7 evidence. They have not brought forth any evidence to 
8 show fraud in the inducement. They have just alleged 
9 that some statement was made and have not fulfilled their 
10 legal duty to make those specific facts. 
11 And I think it is quite clear that we could not 
12 have fraudulently induced them to agree to pay the past 
13 due amount. They owed it. They couldn't be fraudulently 
14 induced to pay that amount. And so that amount is quite 
15 obviously due, and that was $61,866.96. The date they 
16 signed the Settlement Agreement, they owed that much. So 
17 at most, if they were induced fraudulently with regard to 
18 any dollar figure, it is the difference between that 
19 amount and the 65,000, which they agreed to pay, or 
20 $3,100. 
21 THE COURT: Well, you are not suggesting you 
22 can divide that out, separate that out, are you? 
23 MR. SWAN: Well, their specific allegation is 
24 that we were fraudulently induced to pay a sum on the 
25 future rents; and so I think it needs to be clear that 
15 
the I • :: • E :i i t = scap 'e J :1 a b:i ] :1 ti • :: i 1 tl: :t€ • i; a e • t ::i : .€ a mo i it: it, 
because they haven't alleged that they were fraudulently 
induced to pa y the past :ii le a mounts 
•' • Tl IE X U R T : Maybe I am ml.ssi.ng something, but 
you 've moved for summary judgment DII liability asserted 
1: i i »B/:I : f tl iii: promj ssoi i i! n ::  t- = •. correct? 
MR. SWAN' 1 1 ., I 1 i correct. 
• •;^:- 'THE COURT: Okay. And Included, I n that, 
\ ..an .-:. u.r ptiri i,c amount which they say they u*r, 
f
^ v admit they "'WP and then the balance * F* whatever 
MR. SWAN 
r 
for Summary Judgment, you are :\ j suggesting that it : 
"^ni **••* *-v- * were . n, fact . * .' • • » "ir that I should 
. _, were i i f ac - . iib I., 0 00 a,:i i, i 
somehow there is n question as •*-- balance, you are 
sugges+ ; .- • 
MR. SWAN y m g :o suggest is 
that thF- issu*- , •* t raudulent inducement. *r :v:,-r , •. ;\ 
I 
when ywu iuvr. - - :. L ^ i^L- ^  the 
materiality issue and it is just not material because 
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1 their liability was so large, a half million dollars, 
2 that they have not shown anything that would have 
3 suggested that agreeing to pay an extra $3,100 would have 
4 changed their decision one way or another. And so I 
5 think it goes to whether that is a material fact or not. 
6 And so that is the reason I raise that. I just think 
7 that this whole lawsuit, they are trying to escape 
8 liability, if you read their Answer and their 
9 Counterclaim, for the full promissory note, the full 
10 settlement agreement. And I think that is somewhat of a 
11 smoke screen because they couldn't have been fraudulently 
12 induced to agree to pay something that they owed. And so 
13 there is just not the materiality that they seem to 
14 suggest. And then I will save some time for rebuttal. 
15 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Mr. McDonald. 
16 MR. MCDONALD: Thank you, Your Honor. As 
17 counsel points out, Your Honor, this action was commenced 
18 on November 14, 1990. The complaint seeks recovery under 
19 a promissory note dated December 8, 1988, for the 
20 principal sum of $55,000. It is important to note that 
21 the circumstances giving rise to the execution of the 
22 note was the fact that there was a pre-existing lease 
23 between the plaintiff and defendant. At that time when 
24 Gump & Ayers entered into the lease, they were expanding 
25 their business operation later because, obviously the 
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1 obligations under Rule 11, I did not feel justified in 
2 asserting a serious claim of fraud on the basis of 
3 something he had heard at a cocktail party. So in the 
4 Answer, I specifically — 
5 THE COURT: I am aware you reserved — made 
6 that observation in your Answer. 
7 MR. MCDONALD: All right. So in that 
8 circumstance, I filed the Answer and merely reserved 
9 that, not asserting it because of my Rule 11 
10 responsibilities. 
11 I get back a Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
12 they say, "It is a promissory note. You have admitted 
13 you executed the note, so we want judgment." So at that 
14 point in time I conduct a little informal discovery and 
15 also review the documents that they have submitted in 
16 support of this motion. It is then I discover that on 
17 November 23rd, in fact, they had re-leased the premises 
18 to a company called "Matrix" who has some overlapping 
19 directorates that are obviously are affiliated companies. 
20 So at that point in time, realizing now I have a clear 
21 claim for fraud, I move to amend my complaint. They want 
22 to lower it to a promissory note case. 
23 THE COURT: What is the representation 
24 specifically that you allege was made that was false? 
25 MR. MCDONALD: Representation was made that the 
19 
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1 In any event, the worse case scenario, the 
2 premises had been relet. So the plaintiff's statement to 
3 my client that it hadn't been relet was false. And as 
4 noted in the affidavit, we would not have entered into 
5 that promissory note and we don't agree that there is 
6 only $3,000 in this dispute. The calculations for the 
7 past rent, inasmuch as this is a promissory note case, 
8 rather than a collection of a lease case, I haven't 
9 shurned the case to answer that, but there are many 
10 disputes on how much was attributable to future rent and 
11 how much was attributable to past rents. And I think our 
12 J calculations are in the affidavit. 
13 In any event, after filing the Summary 
14 Judgment, we found that this evidence, and it is now 
15 asserted and the cases are clear, if in fact that 
16 promissory note was procured by fraud, and this fraud 
17 being that the premises were not relet and that we were 
18 going to be liable for an unspecified amount of time, it 
19 must be cured by fraud. The notion that they put into 
20 the Settlement Agreement that we didn't rely on anything, 
21 or that we are waiving and releasing each other of all 
22 rights, are still the effects of fraud. We were under 
23 the assumption of the good-faith representation that the 
24 property hadn't been relet. 
25 Since that time there has been all kinds of 
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That is the whole purpose for signing the note, otherwise 
we would have paid the past rent. 
THE COURT: And you are not contending that 
there was a material omission in the face of a duty? Mr. 
Swan has argued that alternatively and I haven't heard 
you respond to that. How do you answer that? 
MR. MCDONALD: I think in the factual picture, 
and again we are going without having a trial to call all 
of the witnesses, that obviously if one makes a statement 
that the premises are not relet, or even if he fell short 
of that, saying, "You are going to be subjected to 
liability for future unpaid rent," that would result then 
in a minimum obligation to disclose, even if it occurred 
at a later date that the premises had been rented. 
THE COURT: Well, but Mr. Swan has argued the 
law states that a duty arises where there is a special 
relationship, fiduciary relationship, where there can be 
undue influence or if there is a statutory duty. Do you 
argue with his analysis of the law? 
MR. MCDONALD: Not if it is based on duty. I 
am basing an omission to state a material fact on the 
grounds of not any fiduciary duty between the parties 
because they are arm's-length tenant-landlord. The 
problem arises — 
THE COURT: There has to be an omission in the 
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said that there were no prospective tenants. 
Apart from the fraud issue, I think there is a 
dispute as to the payments made by defendant prior to 
discovering the fraud. That is noted in our memorandum, 
paragraph 7. There is another factual dispute. There 
are disputes concerning the computations of the amounts 
due and owing, assuming the note is enforceable. Those 
are addressed in paragraph 10 of our memorandum. There 
are disputes concerning the duration of the lease 
payments, noted in paragraph 19 of our memorandum. There 
are factual disputes concerning the times of negotiations 
of the promissory note, which may bear on the very thing 
we are talking about and that is in paragraph 20 of the 
memorandum. There are disputes as to the number and 
amount of lease payments, paragraph 21 of our memorandum. 
There are disputes as to the amount of the lease payments 
that were due and owing, paragraph 23 and 24 of our 
memorandum. There are disputes as to the offer of the 
Settlement Agreement on the promissory note, because 
there is some ambiguity in it. One says it is a per annum 
interest rate and the note says it is a flat rate. That 
is one dispute that will have to be resolved by parol 
evidence, which isn't appropriate for a summary judgment 
because it depends on what you believe. There are 
critical matters which defendant has not had the 
25 
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1 inappropriate. Thank you. 
2 THE COURT: All right, thank you, Mr. McDonald. 
3 MR. SWAN: I would like to respond to a few 
4 comments. First of all, this comment doesn't really 
5 relate to the motion, but Mr. McDonald said, "Well, 
6 Matrix and my client are obviously affiliated companies,M 
7 and I think that is an attempt to show that there are 
8 some underhanded dealings, some back door, back room 
9 negotiations. There are not facts to support that. Just 
10 because you have a director on one board of directors and 
11 a director on another board of directors that are 
12 independent board of directors, does not mean they are 
13 affiliated. There is just no evidence to support that, 
14 so I really object strenuously to that kind of statement. 
15 It is clear that the defense to the enforcement 
16 of the note is fraudulent inducement based upon the 
17 statement, MIt has not been relet. The premises are 
18 vacant." That is what they are now claiming. But they 
19 have never said that is a. material misstatement. As Mr. 
20 McDonald uses his hypothetical, I will too, that there is 
21 a continuum of statements. Let's say my client said, 
22 MThe moon is made out of cheese." Well, they may believe 
23 that. They may have taken that as true, but that doesn't 
24 make it material as to the negotiations. 
25 THE COURT: But weren't they negotiating to 
27 
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1 material and here is the reason why. There is a case 
2 very close to this "Sugar House Finance vs. Anderson," 
3 which we cited in our memorandum. It is a case that was 
4 decided on a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court 
5 enforced a Settlement Agreement. It was between a debtor 
6 and a creditor. In this case the creditor wanted to get 
7 out of the Settlement Agreement because he found out the 
8 debtor had more assets than the debtor disclosed, and the 
9 Court wouldn't let them do that, and the Supreme Court 
10 wouldn't let them do that. It says, "Misrepresentation 
11 may be made either by affirmative statement or by 
12 material omission where there exists a duty to speak. 
13 Such a duty will not be found where the parties deal at 
14 arm's length and where the underlying facts are 
15 reasonably within the knowledge of both parties. Under 
16 the circumstances, the plaintiff is obliged to take steps 
17 to inform himself and to protect his own interest." 
18 There is no allegation that the defendant here 
19 has complied with that duty. It says, "In the present 
20 case plaintiff alleges fraud both in the defendant's 
21 failure to state that he owned property in question and 
22 in his failure to disclose the proposed sale thereof." 
23 And the Court found so what? The creditor could have 
24 found those things out had he known, and it just wasn't 
25 material to resolution of a dispute. 
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1 Motion for Summary Judgment if they have had ample time 
2 for discovery. Now this somehow goes back to their 
3 question, "Oh, we sprung this Motion for Summary Judgment 
4 on them." We did not. We responded to their discovery. 
5 We waited more than a month after we responded to their 
6 discovery to file a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
7 If this Court is not going to grant the Motion 
8 for Summary Judgment, and allow them to amend their 
9 pleadings and add this counterclaim and add the other 
10 defenses that they have made, then I think my client 
11 should be awarded its attorney's fees and costs for 
12 having gone through the exercise of filing a Motion for 
13 Summary Judgment, not knowing that they were going to 
14 suddenly raise all of these additional allegations after 
15 they have gone through their first set of discovery. 
16 Mr. McDonald makes a lot out of his Rule 11 
17 obligations. Well, he did his discovery. He didn't 
18 choose to file an amended answer or counterclaim until 
19 after the Motion for Summary Judgment was filed, and he 
20 had plenty of time to do so. 
21 So I think my client has been prejudiced by 
22 that and that is why we have moved to not allow the 
23 amendment and some other things, moved for protective 
24 orders to try to focus that we were following things in 
25 good order, allowing plenty of time for the defendant to 
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1 THE COURT: Mr. Swan, you do have the last 
2 word, so — 
3 MR. SWAN: Again, he has raised the issue that 
4 it is material because they believed they would not have 
5 owed any money. That fact is not before the Court. In 
6 fact, the affidavits clearly show that my client was 
7 still losing money after the Settlement Agreement. And 
8 so they try to make it material by saying that they 
9 wouldn't have owed any money but that is just not the 
10 case. The uncontroverted facts are, and there is a long 
11 calculation in Mr. Lloyd"s affidavit of the rent 
12 differential. It was leased at a less square footage 
13 rate, that they were losing money. And so they were 
14 filling their duty to mitigate. 
15 And the reason I say muddy up the water is, it 
16 seems incongruous to me that a party can say, "We weren't 
17 relying on any of our representations and we had advice 
18 of counsel." But now when we are asked to pay, "Oh, by 
19 the way, we did rely and.we want to make that the defense 
20 and make that an issue." 
21 Now I think also in executory courts, the law 
22 is quite clear that if this Court were to find that this 
23 executory court was induced by fraud and it is voidable, 
24 then that opens up the defendant to potential liability 
25 under the lease because it is executory in nature by its 
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very terms if it is not completed until paid in full. So 
that whole Pandora's box would be opened up. I am not 
suggesting the Court should not open that up, but the 
Settlement Agreement was very clearly designed to try to 
liquidate an amount, and it really didn't make a 
difference based upon its own terms about whether the 
premises were relet or not. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, counsel. 
(At this point the Judge gave her ruling which 
has already previously been transcribed.) 
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1 FRIDAY, JANUARY 10, 1992 
2 JUDGE'S RULING 
3 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, counsel. I 
4 appreciate your arguments and the thoroughness in which you 
5 presented this this afternoon. I have considered this and, 
6 as I told you before, I have read the memoranda and 
1 voluminous pleadings that have been submitted on this case. 
8 This is the Plaintiff!s Motion for Summary 
9 Judgment to enforce a settlement agreement that was entered 
10 into by the parties at the time that the defendant terminate4 
11 the lease unilaterally. Frankly, I have given the fraud 
12 claim considerable thought. I am frankly persuaded that if 
13 any misrepresentations were made, that under these facts the 
14 defendant has not shown by clear and convincing evidence 
15 that the misrepresentations were material for the reasons 
16 argued by the plaintiff's counsel, but here and in its 
17 pleadings. 
18 This is a rather unusual kind of a ruling, I think,] 
19 I in these kinds of actions but there is a burden on the 
defendant to show by clear and convincing evidence that 20 
22 
24 
25 
21 fraudulent misrepresentations were made or omissions in the 
face of the duty to speak. I am not convinced that there 
23 were misrepresentations, but there is some evidence to the 
contrary. And so on that point, plaintiffs would not be 
entitled to summary judgment alone. But it seems to me 
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that that, under all of the facts, including the contractual 
obligations which the defendants submit they did owe at 
that time, both having already accrued and what they were 
exposed to, and in light of the damages amounts that the 
plaintiffs did suffer as a result of the termination of 
the lease, and cost associated with re-letting, and all of 
that, when you look at all of the numbers that are involved, 
I just don't see this as material. I don't think that the 
defendants have met their burden of showing by clear and 
convincing evidence that there was fraud in 
in this action. For that reason then, I am 
to accord that view and would rather on the 
liability grant summary judgment in favor of 
Now, there are contested issues as 
of interest owing, whether it is ten percent 
per annum; and we haven't addressed that tod 
there is any dispute about attorney!s fees, 
the inducement 
not inclined 
issue of 
the plaintiff. 
to the amount 
or ten percent 
ay. Also, if 
we will need to 
deal with that as well. So, counsel, I would like you to 
address the issue of damages at this time, procedurally, 
just how you would like the Court to resolve 
MR. SWAN: Well, to be frank, Your 
not done any legal analysis of construction 
rates when it is not -- when the phrase "per 
that. 
Honor, I have 
of interest 
annum" is not 
set forth in the note. It would be my suspicion because of 
my practice, and I do this quite a bit, that that is a 
2 
3 
4 
1 phrase or an understanding of the note that the Court can 
2 I infer, otherwise it is not sensical. Calculate interest on 
some kind of period. And I think we can show by the way 
that the defendants were calculating their own payments 
5 I and by their own affidavit, they show how much they were 
6 paying. They were calculating it on a per annum basis. 
1 For instance, they owed their first payment so many months 
8 after the execution of the note. They paid the principal 
9 amount due, plus the accrued interest portion and that 
10 calculation is quite simple. It was ten percent per annum 
H is what they were using. And so, I think that there is a 
12 clear showing by the conduct of the parties that there was 
13 a meeting of the minds that that meant a yearly basis. 
14 if the Court would like me to brief how the Court 
'5 is supposed to construe that, I can do the calculation right 
16 here and show you that that is how they construed it them-
17 J selves based upon their own affidavit. 
THE COURT: I don't know that we are going to get 
this issue resolved today and I don't know on what other 
18 
19 
m points the defendants might disagree with the amount of 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
damages. I think the better way to handle this, unless 
Mr. Mc Donald has got a better idea, is to submit your 
judgment on the issue of liability and set forth the amount 
of damages. And if Mr. Mc Donald objects to that, then we 
can have a hearing on that. Unless, Mr. Mc Donald, do you 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
have a 
and it 
Court 
nother suggestion? 
is 
and 
as a case 
MR. MC DONALD: 
inherent in th 
that is this: 
for summary ju 
decided on the basis of 
being 
be due 
to be 
an 
» wi 
add 
issue and that 
thout the note. 
ressed. There 
The problem that I have, Your 
e ruling that has been made by 
that the 
dgment on 
something 
was their 
• Honor 
the 
case has been presented 
a note. It has been 
that I didn't regard 
calculations of what 
That isn't an issue that was 
as 
would 1 
raised 
were substantial factual disputes 
with the manner in which they claimed this. VJhen you say 
there is only 3,000 in dispute --
THE COURT: No, no. I am not talking about that. 
I am not talking about the amount of the note itself. The 
issues that I really see that remain unresolved as to 
damages, are the interest figure, attorney's fees and costs 
I don't see, you know, the basic underlying amount of the 
promissory note as remaining at issue. 
MR. MC DONALD: Well, in light of the Court's 
decisions, it is not. The problem I had with it is, and I 
guess maybe -- now that I hear the Court's basis for 
non-materiality, it is based upon a finding that their 
calculation of what would be due without the note are 
correct. 
THE COURT: That I used as an overall context. 
However, my ruling, my finding, was assuming there were 
1 misrepresentations that were made, they are not material to 
2 the promissory note and the negotiations of the promissory 
j note. And I find that because I felt that the defendants 
4 has by law the burden of proof, rather heavy burden of 
5 proof to show by clear and convincing evidence that they 
5 were in fact material, and I didn't see that that burden 
7 had been met. 
g Now the only issues that I do see that remain to 
9 be resolved are whether the interest was per annum and as 
IQ to that, I didn't focus on that as we prepared here today. 
II But there is obviously contention about who drafted this 
note and therefore, you know, this may come down to a ruling 
of construction, you know, as to who drafted the note and 
14 I whether it was ten percent or --
15 MR. MC DONALD: It is parol evidence. 
|g THE COURT: Maybe it is parol evidence, but I 
17 think that that issue is an issue that remains in my mind 
18 and then the issue of attorney's fees and costs. Those are 
19 the only issues that I see that remain. 
20 MR. MC DONALD: Well, I can't conceive of how we 
21 can resolve those issues on summary judgment. So maybe we 
22 can attempt. I will certainly attempt to resolve this in 
23 light of the Court's ruling so we don't have to come back, 
24 but I can't conceive of how we can in this circumstance 
25 start resolving factual disputes. 
12 
13 
1 I THE COURT: Well, I am just looking for a procedural 
2 I mechanism in which to resolve it. That is all. And if it 
3 I is something that is reserved for trial because it can't 
4 be resolved in a summary fashion, then so be it because that 
5 is the way it will come out. 
5 However, I would like to address at least a couple 
7 of the other motions. I think with regard to the issue of 
g damages, I am granting summary judgment on the issue of 
9 liability as requested in plaintifffs motion. I am not 
1Q resolving today, I am not ruling on the issue, deciding one 
11 way or the other on the issue of damages. And that issue 
12 remains alive. If you want to make a specific motion on the 
13 issue of damages, attorney's fees and costs, then you may do 
14 so, or if you are not able to resolve that by discussions 
15 between the two of you, otherwise it is considered preserved 
15 for trial if no motion is filed. 
17 And with regard to the other pending motions, as 
18 to the Motion to Amend, implicit in my ruling is that I 
19 would deny the Motion to Amend to allege a counterclaim 
20 setting forth fraud as a cause of action. 
21 MR. MC DONALD: You are denying the Motion to 
22 Amend? 
23 THE COURT: That is correct, and in so doing I 
24 don't find that it was unreasonably -- or rather, that it 
25 was untimely. I think that it was early enough in the 
1 lawsuit, but rather I looked to the substantive issue of 
2 fraud and it doesn't make any sense to me that having found 
3 that -- I don't see that when the issue has been framed as 
4 to the claims of fraud, that there has been clear and 
5 convincing evidence to show, that it would make sense then 
6 to turn around and say, "Okay, now, amend your Answer and 
1 include the counterclaim on this very issue that I just said 
8 wasn't clear and convincing at this point." That is why 
9 I am denying the Motion to Amend, 
10 MR. MC DONALD: The problem I have, if the Motion 
11 to Amend is not granted, then fraud isn't before the Court 
12 on summary judgment. 
13 MR. SWAN; It is in the way of the affirmative 
14 defense on how to defend a motion. 
15 THE COURT: Well, you defend it on that basis and 
16 I considered it in that context. It was a pending motion 
17 i reserved on that. I indicated I had read all of the 
18 pleadings about it. Motion to Amend is denied. 
19 Now, are there any other motions that we need to 
20 deal with today? 
21 MR. MC DONALD: I think the others would be moot 
22 now. 
23 MR. SWAN: I believe so, Your Honor. The Motion 
24 to Strike the Affidavit of John Parsons, that was submitted 
25 in the support of their opposition memorandum. Our motion 
1 for Protective Order is probably moot since there is no 
2 need for discovery. Just so the Court knows, we have 
3 I answered that discovery belatedly to try to get this matter 
cleaned up and maybe settle this case. So it was made moot 
5 by our own response to their discovery except for maybe thei|r 
* I response for attorney's fees. I don't know. 
Motion to compel, I think that is made moot. They] 
4 
7 
8 I had a Motion to Strike our supplemental affidavits and I 
* ' think the Court has allowed those appendix implicit in its 
10 ruling and been willing to consider those. I think those 
H are all moot 
12 THE COURT: Very well. Is there anything else 
13 then, counsel? 
1* I MR. M,C DONALD: Will you prepare an Order? 
(Talking to Mr. Swan.) 
THE COURT: Yes. Mr. Swan, I want you to prepare 
a judgment and Order in accordance with the ruling this 
afternoon, and do you need a scheduling in case? 
MR. SWAN: For a trial? 
THE COURT: No, I wouldn't set it for trial. 
Just in terms of a discovery cut-off, if you are not 
completed and cut-off for any other motions. 
MR. SWAN: Well, it would be my hope that based 
upon this Court's ruling of liability, that Mr. McDonald 
and I can get together and resolve this issue on damages. 
8 
15 
16 
17 
18 
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20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
I If his client still wants to fight, then maybe we will do 
2 
12 
13 
those. I don't know what the position is going to be. 
3 THE COURT: Why don't you do this-- Oh, go ahead, 
4 Mr. Mc Donald. 
5 I MR. MC DONALD: Why don't we address that? 
g Obviously, neither of us have had an opportunity to think 
1 in the new context of the case. I would suggest that if 
g in fact we are unable to agree and you think it is a 
9 summary judgment issue, we should file a supplemental or 
jQ a different motion so we can now address what we didn't 
II know we were going to have to address today. In the 
meantime, we will attempt to resolve it in light of the 
Court's ruling reserving all appeal rights and so forth 
14 I so we can bring it to a conclusion. 
jc THE COURT: Well, do you see the need to do any 
lg additional discovery or you are just not prepared to 
17 analyze that? 
1 8 MR. MC DONALD: Well, I don't think we will know 
j9 that until we can determine whether we can resolve the 
20 damage issue. If the damage issue can be resolved, the 
21 case is over unless there is an appeal filed. 
22 THE COURT: Why don't you do this. If you see 
23 the need for -- if you are not able to resolve it satis-
24 factoriy between yourselves, then why don't you on or befor^ 
25 December 31st to file a proposed scheduling --
1 MR. MC DONALD: You mean January? 
2 THE COURT: What did I say? 
3 MR. MC DONALD: December. 
4 THE COURT: I am looking at January and said 
5 December. File by January 31st a proposed schedule and 
6 all I want you to include in that is discovery cut-off and 
7 about two weeks after that a motion -- a cut-off for any 
8 other dispositive motions you might have. And about a 
9 week after that, if no dispositive motions are filed, then 
10 a date by which one of you would file a Certification of 
11 Readiness for Trial. And at that point, then we will have 
12 a scheduling conference and schedule a final pretrial and 
13 trial. But don't do that unless you find it necessary. 
14 In other words, if you can't resolve it otherwise. 
15 MR. SWAN: One of my concerns, Your Honor, is I 
16 am going to -- cause I don't take as copious of notes as 
17 i should when you rule, I am probably going to require a 
18 transcript of the ruling portion of this hearing, so I can 
19 make sure I have got everything in the Order. I don't 
20 know how long it will take to get something in order to 
21 present something to Mr. Mc Donald. 
22 THE REPORTER: I can do it right away. 
23 THE COURT: Dorothy says she can do it right away 
24 MR. SWAN: Then we should be able to meet that 
25 deadline. 
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THE COURT: If you can, fine. I am not so concerned 
about January 31st as I am if you -- if you are not able to 
resolve it, then let's get a scheduling in place and then we 
can get this matter resolved. 
MR. MC DONALD: In light of the unknown, why don't 
we just have it at such a time as we find we are unable to 
negotiate, if we can. We will just file for a scheduling 
conference and will go from there. 
MR. SWAN: My anticipation if we can't agree on 
this interest rate issue, then I will file a Motion for 
Summary Judgment on that issue. I am pretty confident I 
think I know what the law is. 
THE COURT: All right. The final ruling will be 
this, in order to give you a little more time, if you are 
not able to resolve this then by February 14th, and that is 
more than a month down the road, if you are not able to 
resolve it by then, then submit a proposed schedule if you 
can agree on one. Okay? 
MR. MC DONALD: Otherwise, move for a scheduling 
conference? 
THE COURT: Well, no, just submit your respective 
one. I don't think we need to have another hearing about 
that. I am just looking for the easiest way to get that 
done. 
MR. MC DONALD: All right, thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
• • • • • 
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MONDAY, NOVEMBER 3 0 , 1 9 9 2 : P.M. SESSION 
J U D G E ' S B E N C H R U L I N G 
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 
I reviewed the motions and all the memoranda that 
have been submitted and the affidavits, and I am prepared to 
rule at this time on the motions. There are two motions before 
the Court: The Plaintiff's Motion for what is essentially a 
partial motion or a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the 
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
The specific issue first to be resolved is the 
construction of the interest rate in the promissory note. Now, 
parties to a contract such as this are not entitled to a better 
contract than the one that they entered into. And having said 
that, it is incumbent upon the Court to make a first 
16; determination that in a contract dispute whether the underlying 
17 contract, in this case the promissory note, is clear and 
18 unambiguous. 
19 And in this particular case, the language that is 
20 relevant to the interest rate makes no mention of a per annum 
21 interest rate. It doesn't make mention of a flat rate interest 
22 rate either. I don't think there is any ambiguity about that 
23; contract in and of itself, just that it's missing a term. 
It seems to me that in looking at that, and also 
25| looking at the other language, "interest to accrue," or the 
i 
24 
-\ . -» i^ v M * 4 A 
II accruing language only makes sense if this contract was to 
21 provide for per annum interest rate. So then you have one part 
3 of the contract, the note, making reference to "accruing." It 
4 does only make sense if there is a per annum rate, I believe, 
5 as a matter of law, and yet there is no mention of whether the 
6j rate is to be a flat rate or an accruing rate. If it were a 
7| flat rate, then you might even have an ambiguous note, but 
i 
8; that's not really the issue before the Court. 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
The plaintiff relies on the statute which sets forth 
what is to happen when parties, public or private, to deeds and 
I 
other documents mentioned in that have not mentioned whether a 
rate -- how a rate is to be calculated, at least when there is 
no rate that's mentioned. And I paraphrase in very rough 
14| fashion the statute. 
15 As I look at the statute, in looking at this 
16i promissory note, it appears to me that the plaintiff's position 
17 
18 
is well taken. That the statute does control in this case, 
does provide the Court the justification for inserting a term 
19 in a contract. The parties are not entitled to a better 
201 contract than the one that they entered into, and generally 
21 courts do not imply terms or read terms or add terms to a 
22 contract. But in this case I think the legislature has done 
23j just that. 
24j And therefore, for those reasons and the other 
25j reasons set forth by Mr. Swan on behalf of the plaintiff, I am 
^ ,\ r\ r*f A — 
4 
1j going to grant partial summary judgment in favor of the 
2 1 plaintiff and deny that aspect of summary judgment on behalf of 
3 the defendant. 
4 Then as to the question of late fees and attorney's 
5j fees, the contract provided for the payment of late fees when 
6 1 payments were, in fact, late. And it appears to me as I look 
7: at that, that the contract is clear and unambiguous, that late 
8 fees were to apply. And finally with regard to attorney's 
9j fees, clearly attorney's fees are appropriate for enforcing the 
10 rights under that promissory note. In this case the plaintiff 
11 has prevailed on the issues that it has advanced. And 
12j consistent with that provision, the Court also grants summary 
13j judgment on the issue of attorney's fees. 
14| And there has not been -- well, in any event, for 
15| those reasons I am going to grant summary judgment as prayed 
16j for by the plaintiff and deny it as to the defendant. 
17 Is there anything I have overlooked? 
18 Counsel. 
19 MR. McDONALD: In preparing the order I take it that 
20 we can insert that, so there is no question as to the basis of 
21 the Court's decision, that this decision was made out of the 
22; consideration of the extrinsic evidence. 
i 
23 THE COURT: That is correct. 
24 
25 
MR. SWAN: Your Honor, you have called it a partial 
summary judgment. I believe this resolves all the issues. 
~~~" ~ 00074T-
3 
4 
5 
lj It's only partial because there was a prior partial, but it's a 
2; final judgment as far as all the issues. 
THE COURT: That's my understanding, Mr. Swan. I 
want you to prepare an order for this Motion for Summary 
Judgment. I want you to prepare a judgment consistent with all 
6j these rulings. 
7j Now, you do not have to prepare findings of fact. 
8; That's not required by law. Sometimes you get into more 
arguments over what was found and what wasn't. I do want to 
say that when I make a ruling from the bench, I try to hit on 
the highlights of the bases for the Court's decision. I don't 
mean those remarks to be all-inclusive. And I have now adopted 
the practice of at least trying to remember to say, "and for 
other reasons set forth," so that those reasons that are 
15i consistent with the Court's ruling can also be considered. But 
i 
16» I did find those arguments of the plaintiff persuasive under 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
17 the facts of the case and in looking at that note and that 
18 statute. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23* 
» 
24! 
25! 
MR. SWAN: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 
(This concludes the Judge's Bench Ruling.) 
• * * 
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